





Foreign Direct Investment in China’s 










Working Papers Series 
Center on Globalization and  
Sustainable Development 
 
The Earth Institute at Columbia University 
www.earth.columbia.edu  
 2
Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Provinces 
Lessons for the State of Gujarat 
 
  




  All over the world, FDI is seen as an important source of non-debt inflows, and is 
increasingly being sought as a vehicle for technology flows, and as a means of building 
inter-firm linkages in a world in which MNCs are primarily operating on the basis of a 
network of global interconnections. In the current global scenario, it is possible for India 
to achieve very dynamic growth based upon labor-intensive manufacturing, which 
combines the vast supply of Indian labor, including skilled managerial and engineering 
labor, with foreign capital, technology, and markets In this paper, we plan to study the 
FDI experiences of the Chinese provinces, especially the coastal ones. The lessons from 
these regions have been analyzed in the context of Gujarat, thereby helping develop some 
recommendations. We have also undertaken a case study of the Chinese province of 
Guangdong, which has attracted large sums of FDI in China 
 
Gujarat is not rated as one of the most attractive destinations for FDI in India, 
perhaps ranked around 5th or 6th in the country. It is interesting to note that while Gujarat 
is perhaps next only to Maharashtra as far as attracting domestic private investment is 
concerned, it does not do as well when it comes to foreign direct investment. Gujarat is 
one of the front runner states of India as far as some of the manufacturing sectors, such as 
engineering goods, chemical and petrochemical products, drugs and pharmaceuticals, and 
fertilizers, among others are concerned. However, it is essential that the state focuses 
much more than in the past on labor-intensive manufacturing production for exports. The 
potential for attracting much higher volumes of FDI, especially in Gujarat’s SEZs is 
enormous. This will not only bring in greater FDI flows, but will also raise exports from 
Gujarat and create large-scale employment opportunities. 
 
  We conclude with a number of lessons for Gujarat for attracting higher levels of 
FDI. These are in the areas of legislative and policy reform, government processes and 
machinery, infrastructure, special economic zones, networking with Gujarati non-resident 
Indians, and finally, the idea of setting up an FDI council comprising of state civil 
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Foreign Direct Investment in China’s Provinces 






India accounts for a meager 2.4 percent of the world surface area, yet it sustains a 
whopping 16.7 percent of the world population, with 1.1 billion people residing in 28 
states and 7 union territories. In terms of population size, Gujarat ranks 10th among the 
states of India, with a population of around 51 million, of which roughly 39 percent 
reside in urban areas. With a mere 6 percent of the geographical area and 5 percent of the 
national population, the state contributes to 21 percent of the country’s exports and 6.4 
percent of the national GDP at constant prices. 
 
The variation across Indian states and union territories is enormous in regard to 
physical geography, culture, and economic conditions. Some states have achieved rapid 
economic growth in recent years, such as Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu, while 
others, such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa have languished. The goal of this paper is 
to study the experiences of China’s coastal provinces in regard to foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and its impact on the economic performance of the Chinese provinces 
with a view to draw relevant lessons for the state of Gujarat. The paper may most 
profitably be read as a companion to the paper by Bajpai (2004), on regional economic 
policies, geography, and growth episodes in China’s coastal provinces.   
 
All over the world, FDI is seen as an important source of non-debt inflows, and is 
increasingly being sought as a vehicle for technology flows, and as a means of building 
inter-firm linkages in a world in which MNCs are primarily operating on the basis of a 
network of global interconnections. In the current global scenario, it is possible for India 
to achieve very dynamic growth based upon labor-intensive manufacturing, which 
combines the vast supply of Indian labor, including skilled managerial and engineering 
labor, with foreign capital, technology, and markets (Bajpai and Sachs, 1997).  
 
On this basis, the East Asian economies have achieved growth rates consistently 
above 6 percent per year, and China has managed growth in excess of 10 percent per year 
in the 1990s. Malaysia, to cite another example, has shifted from being a raw-material 
exporter in the 1970s (with commodities accounting for 80 percent of exports) to a 
manufacturing exporter (with manufactures, mainly electronics, accounting for 70 
percent of exports), with GDP growth of 8 percent per year. MNCs offer the capital, 
international market access, and technology that India lacks, and are therefore vital to 
remolding India as a strong and rapidly growing economy. 
 
 
                                                          
1 This paper has been undertaken as a part of the Columbia Earth Institute and the Indian Institute of 
Management’s joint project for the State Government of Gujarat. Among others, discussions during the 
course of this study with Professors Jeffrey Sachs and Wing Thye Woo were very useful and are gratefully 
acknowledged.  Nicole Volavka provided excellent research assistance. 
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Usually, there are a number of firm-specific and country-specific factors that 
affect location decisions of individual FDI projects. At a very basic level, size of the host 
country in terms of aggregate and per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) and 
proximity of the host country to investing countries are the two key determinants of 
inward FDI (Shatz and Venables, 1999). The United States is a major investor in Mexico 
and Canada; and European Union members are major investors in other advanced 
European countries and Central Europe; Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao are major 
investors in mainland China, especially in the nearby Guangdong province; and Japan is a 
major investor in Asia. 
 
Beyond these two essentially exogenous forces, a number of other factors play an 
important role in attracting FDI, many of which are under the control of the government. 
Policies can influence three broad areas relevant to investors: 1) administrative rules and 
regulations for establishing investments, safeguarding the security of investments, and 
repatriating capital and profits; 2) the process and mechanisms for applying the rules; 3) 
infrastructure, particularly electricity service, communications, and internal and external 
transport; 4) labor costs and tax rates. The main goals should be to make investment 
procedures transparent, business practices efficient, and to have rewarding expected 
profits. 
 
According to the results of a World Economic Forum global executive survey, 
there are six important factors that determine FDI location. Market size is seen as the 
most important factor that a firm has in mind while making a decision on investment 
location. In addition, the expected growth in market size is another significant factor. 
Empirical analysis confirms the significance attached by the investors on both the current 
market size and the expected growth in market size. There exists a strong positive 
correlation between FDI inflows and the market growth index. Another important factor 
in the determination of FDI flows is competitiveness.    
 
Findings of the survey suggest that countries that are more competitive have 
better prospects of attracting FDI,2 especially by an exporting firm.  Empirical results 
bear testimony to this relationship, which is statistically significant.  Yet another factor 
determining FDI is the ability to repatriate capital and remit profits.  With regard to this 
factor too, there is strong statistical evidence to suggest that investors view inability to 
repatriate capital and remit profit as one of their main concerns.  The more open an 
economy to the rest of the world, the more likely it is to offer freedom in capital 
movement across national borders.  A high degree of openness would imply lesser 
restrictions on remittance of capital income that may be in the form of interests, 
dividends, profits, or capital gains.  The remaining two factors cited by executives as 
determinants of FDI are productivity and work habits of workers and quality of 
infrastructure. 
 
                                                          
2 Competitiveness is defined as a country’s ability to achieve sustained high rate of growth in per capita real income, as 
measured by per capita GDP in constant prices.  It is judged by the overall competitiveness index (CI). Eight factors 
make up the CI.  These are openness, government, finance, technology, infrastructure, management, labor, and 
institutions.  
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FDI is usually sub-divided into three-types. These are: export-oriented FDI, 
domestic market-oriented FDI, and infrastructure FDI. All three bring benefits. All three 
have overlapping determinants, but each has its own special set of attractors. All three 
types of FDI also bring the potential for linkages to the domestic economy and increased 
domestic economic activity through purchase of local inputs and the production of inputs 
for use by local producers.   
 
Export-oriented FDI links the local economy to the international economy. Openness to 
both imports and exports has been shown to be a powerful force for growth (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995), and growth has so far been the only credible means of alleviating absolute 
poverty. Nearly every episode of rapid growth by a developing country after World War 
II has involved the expansion of manufactured exports. In many cases, this has come 
through the mediation of MNCs. 
 
Domestic market-oriented FDI brings new products and services to market. These may 
be new on many dimensions—either goods or services that were previously unavailable, 
or goods and services that were previously available but at a different level of quality. In 
some cases, domestic market-oriented FDI can supply intermediate inputs that otherwise 
would be unavailable or much more expensive, helping expand not only the efficiency 
and profit opportunities of local industry, but also the range of local industries that may 
exist. Domestic market-oriented FDI also exposes other domestic firms to increased 
competition, forcing them to act efficiently and to improve their products and service to 
retain and attract new customers.   
 
Even a large domestic market such as India’s or Brazil’s is not large enough to 
spur strong internal competition in the absence of vigorous competition from abroad. 
Protected home markets turned monopolistic or oligopolistic, because the minimum 
efficient scale of production often represented a large proportion of the home market. 
Domestic enterprises, unchallenged by foreign competition, turn lazy and rely on state 
largess rather than their own efforts to survive. 
 
However, competition can not only help incumbent firms, but hurt them as well, 
leading affected owners and workers to lobby the government for special protection. 
Managing the demands of narrow interest groups hurt by policy changes is one of the 
toughest tasks facing reformist governments worldwide, even if the vast majority of the 
population—unorganized and often unaware of the stakes—will benefit from the 
projected changes. Therefore, an FDI attraction strategy must involve identifying the 
groups that will most benefit, making sure they understand those benefits, and 
encouraging their political activity as a counterweight to those who might be hurt.   
 
Infrastructure FDI is at once the riskiest for the investor and probably the most promising 
and sensitive for the country receiving the FDI. The benefits are clear. Without reliable 
power, telephone, and transport networks—and now information technology networks—a 
country cannot hope to increase its industrial production and economic growth. This is 
especially true with increased globalization. The sensitivity is also clear. Countries are 
reluctant to have foreign involvement in an important part of their economy. For India, it 
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is important to move forward aggressively with private provision of infrastructure along 
with public investment to the extent feasible. Without foreign involvement, it is highly 
unlikely that India can build the infrastructure it needs and still take care of other 
important objectives, such as primary health care and education. 
 
A study of FDI in China since it began following open door policies provides rich 
lessons for other developing countries aiming to draw more foreign direct investment. 
China, since economic reforms were put in place beginning in 1979, has emerged as a 
strong contender for global FDI, absorbing more than $300 billion in cumulative FDI. In 
2002, though global FDI flows contracted by 27%, those for China grew by 12.5%, 
taking the country’s annual foreign investment to $52.7 billion (see Table 1). Not only 
was 2002 the first year when annual flows crossed the threshold of $50 billion, but also 
the first time that China received more investments than the US3. However, we would 
like to point out here that there are serious problems associated with the definition of FDI 
as used by the Chinese authorities (see Table 2). This results in a large overestimation of 
China’s annual FDI flows, especially when compared to countries like India, which use a 
more restrictive definition of FDI. For a deeper analysis of this issue, see Bajpai and 
Dasgupta (2004a and 2004b). 
 
In this paper, we plan to study the FDI experiences of the Chinese provinces, 
especially the coastal ones. The lessons from these regions have been analyzed in the 
context of Gujarat, thereby helping develop some recommendations. We have also 
undertaken a case study of the Chinese province of Guangdong, which has attracted large 
sums of FDI in China as can be seen from Table 1.  
 
Effectiveness of Policies 
 
Local governments have at their disposal various policy tools through which they can 
have an impact on the process of FDI and development. Some tools, such as tax 
subsidies, are short-term in nature and only serve to offset the cost of doing business in 
the region. Others, such as setting up vocational schools, unfold over a longer period and 
increase the intrinsic attractiveness of the region. 
 
These tools vary in their effect and effectiveness in fostering FDI. In this section we 
present a brief discussion on various policy tools. 
 
▪ FDI Promotion: Countries establish investment promotion councils that could 
either target specific companies through phone calls or visits, or disseminate a 
broader message about the host country’s potential. Such investment councils 
usually act as a one-stop window for foreign companies, even hand-holding the 
companies as they go about investing in local production facilities. Wells and 
Wint show that developing countries with investment promotion councils 
attracted 30% more FDI than countries without them. 
 
? Fiscal and Financial Incentives: Such incentives could be offered in many forms, 
such as tax subsidies and grants. The use of such incentives is widespread, and 
their effectiveness has been established. Several studies find that taxation exerts 
an influence on FDI. 
 
                                                          
3 Source: EIU Country Report, China, 2003 
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? Trade Facilitation: To facilitate trade, countries can adopt various measures such 
as lower tariffs, efficient infrastructure, smoother customs and business processes, 
and Export Processing Zones (EPZs) and Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Such 
measures have a positive impact on the FDI inflows for a region.  
 
▪ Domestic Education and Human Capital Management: Production facilities set up 
by resource-seeking FDI demand a local workforce, skilled and non-skilled. 
Countries that are better placed to serve that demand would be better destinations 
for such foreign investments. Efforts on part of the local government to boost 
local education and skill levels increase the supply of human capital, which in 
turn attracts more FDI. 
 
China first opened up itself to foreign investments in the late 1970s when it began the 
process of economic reforms. Since then, supported by a series of economic reform 
measures, low wages and availability of large-scale manpower, improvements in the 
quality of infrastructure, and competitiveness among the coastal provinces to attract large 
FDI flows, China’s FDI inflows have grown rapidly, and are expected to reach $58 
billion in 2003. In 2002, as mentioned previously, China’s FDI inflows stood at $52.7 
billion. However, it is interesting to note that it was only in 1993, more than a decade 
after reforms were first instituted, that the amount of FDI increased significantly. 
 
Foreign funded enterprises (FFEs) were mainly concentrated in labor-intensive industries, 
accounting for 50.4 percent of their total investments. As a result, capital-intensive 
industries and technology intensive industries received relatively small amounts of the 
total manufacturing FDI, accounting for 22.7 percent and 26.8 percent respectively4. 
FFEs are most prevalent in four industries– clothing and other fiber products, leather and 
fur products, electronics and telecommunication equipment, and sports goods – the fastest 
growing and increasingly export-oriented industries. 
The Coastal States 
The FDI flows into China have suffered from gross imbalance ever since they began, 
with the coastal regions attracting no less than 80% of FDI that has flown into China 
since the mid-1980s (Figure 2). This has polarized the Chinese economy into two 
economic zones, i.e., the rich coastal and north-eastern zones, and the poor western and 
central regions. It was only in 2000 that the Chinese government launched an effort, titled 






                                                          
4 Labor-intensive sectors include: Food processing, Food manufacturing, Textiles, Clothing & other 
fiber products, Leather & Fur products, Timber processing, Furniture, Paper & Paper products, 
Printing, Cultural, Education & Sports goods, Rubber products, Plastic products, Non-metal mineral 
products, Metal products, and Others. Capital-intensive sectors include: Beverage manufacturing, Tobacco 
processing, Petroleum refining & Coking, Chemical materials & products, Chemical fibers, Ferrous metal 
smelting & pressing, Nonferrous metal smelting & pressing, and Transport equipment. Technology 
intensive sectors include: Medical & Pharmaceutical products, General machinery, Special 
machinery, Electrical machinery & equipment, Electronics & Telecommunication equipment, and 
Instruments & Meters. 
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Figure 1 FDI in China: 1984-2002 









































Guangdong – A case study 
The coastal province of Guangdong, situated in southern China, leads the country in 
attracting foreign direct investment and spurring economic growth. Guangdong attracts 
almost as much as half the FDI that flows into the eastern region, propelling its growth 
rate to a stupendous 14.2 percent, much higher than the 8 percent for the national 
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economy. Guangdong, a 177,600 km2 province, makes up about two percent of China’s 
total land area. Its population of 76.5 million accounts for less than one percent of 
China’s population, while it’s GDP of $14.22 billion (2002) accounts for 5 percent of the 
national total (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003, China Statistical Yearbook 2003).  
 
Historically, the Chinese government, hoping to use the coastal states as a buffer 
zone in case of foreign invasion, had concentrated its investments in the central region. In 
the absence of significant state investments in Guangdong, the Chinese government had 
little incentive to continue to restrict the economic development of this province, and 
gave it a head start in the process of instituting reforms to attract FDI flows. Indeed, 
Guangdong was chosen as the forerunner of the new policy and the provincial 
government had considerable autonomy. Three of the four EPZs established in 1979/1980 
were established in Guangdong province.  
 
Guangdong has a long coastline, which provides it with easy access to the world 
markets. This was a strong incentive for foreign companies to setup their production 
facilities in Guangdong, as opposed to states in the interior. In 2002, Guangdong utilized 
$11.33 billion in FDI, representing 21.5 percent of national utilization of FDI (Table 1). 
Since 1998, levels of FDI in Guangdong have ranged from a high of $12.02 billion in 
1998 to a low of $11.28 billion in 2000. While FDI levels have changed slightly over 
these years, there has been a marked increase in GDP, from $9.57 billion in 1998 to 
$14.22 billion in 2002. At the same time, FDI as a percent of GDP has dropped from 
being 125.7 percent in 19985 to 79.1 percent in 2002 (Table 3 and Statistical Yearbook of 
Guangdong 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995).  
 
The huge initial investments in Guangdong made by Foreign Funded Enterprises 
began to pay high rates of return.6 In terms of gross industrial output value, FFE 
contributions to the provincial total have been steadily increasing. In 1980, FFEs 
accounted for a mere 1.9 percent of the total, but in 1999 they accounted for 48.4 percent, 
and in 2002 they made up a massive 61.3 percent (see Table on Guangdong’s economic 
structure). In 2002, gross industrial output value of FFEs was almost equally divided 
between light and heavy industry, with manufacturing making up 79 percent of heavy 
industry’s output (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003).7 The largest output values in 
                                                          
5 FDI figures include investment flows for the year and some parts of FDI stocks where sale of firms, for 
example, leads to double counting from FDI of previous years and value of FFE imported equipment. 
6 Foreign funded enterprises refer to all joint ventures, cooperative operation, exclusively-operated 
enterprises and share-holding companies funded by foreigners in the registered type of enterprise 
ownership. Unless otherwise noted in the text, it includes enterprises funded by Hong Kong, Macau and 
Taiwan.  
7 Light industry refers to industry, which produces consumer goods and hand tools. It consists of two 
categories, depending on the materials used: (1) Industries using farm products as raw materials. These are 
branches of light industry which directly or indirectly use farm products as basic raw materials, including 
the manufacture of food and beverages, tobacco processing, textile clothing, fur and leather manufacturing, 
paper making, printing, etc. (2) Industries using non-farm products as raw materials. These are branches of 
light industry which use manufactured goods as raw materials, including the manufacture of cultural, 
educational articles and sports goods, chemicals, synthetic fiber, chemical products for daily use, glass 
products for daily use, metal products machinery, etc.  
 10
2002 were in electronic and telecommunications equipment (32.5 percent), electric 
equipment and machinery (7.2 percent), textile industry (4.7 percent), raw chemical 
materials and chemical products (4.6 percent), metal products (4.5 percent) and plastic 
products (4.4 percent) (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003). 
 
 




Share in GDP 5.6% 10.2% 9.7%
Structural Composition  GDP
Primary Sector   33.2% 24.7% 12.1%
Secondary Sector   41.1% 39.5% 50.4%
Tertiary Sector 25.7% 35.8% 37.5%
Structure of  Industrial Output Value
Light Industry 63.0% 71.3% 66.0%
Heavy Industry 37.0% 28.7% 34.0%
Contribution to Industry Output Value
State Owned Industry  63.1% 39.3% 7.6%
Collective Owned Enterprises  27.6% 36.3% 22.2%
Foreign Funded   1.9% 6.9% 48.4%
Others 7.3% 17.5% 21.8%
Composition of  FDI
FFE 12.6% 25.4% 34.9%
HMT 87.4% 74.6% 65.1%
Ratio of Exports to GDP 15.2% 34.3% 76.0%
Composition of  Exports
Primary Goods   n.a. 9.8% 3.9%








                                                                                                                                                                             
Heavy industry refers to the industry, which produces capital goods and provides various sectors of the 
national economy with necessary material and technical basis. (1) Mining, quarrying and logging industry 
refers to the industry that extracts natural resources, including extraction of petroleum, coal, metal and 
nonmetal ores and logging. (2) Raw materials industry refers to the industry that provides various sectors of 
the national economy with raw materials, fuels and power. It includes smelting and processing of metals, 
coking and coke chemistry, chemical materials and building materials such as cement, plywood, and 
power, petroleum refining and coal dressing. (3) Manufacturing industry refers to the industry that 
processes raw materials. It includes machine-building industry, which equips sectors of the national 
economy, industry of metal structure and cement products, industries producing means of agricultural 
production, such as chemical fertilizers and pesticides. 
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Top Six Gross Industrial Outputs of FFEs in Guangdong, 2002 
 



















Percent of gross 
industrial output 
32.5 7.2 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003 
 
Since 1980, the share of FFE industrial output value in relation to State-owned 
Industries and Collective-owned Enterprises in Guangdong has been increasing. In 1980, 
FFEs comprised 1.9 percent of the total provincial industry output value, while State-
owned Industry comprised 63.1 percent and Collective-owned Enterprises made up 27.6 
percent.8 In 1990, 1999 and 2002 FFEs made up 6.9 percent, 48.4 percent and 61.4 
percent, respectively, of the total provincial industry output value; State-owned Industry 
made up 39.3 percent, 7.6 percent and 6.8 percent, respectively; Collective-owned 
Enterprises made up 36.3 percent, 22.2 percent and 26.7 percent, respectively 
(Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003).   
 
While the share of FFE industrial outputs in Guangdong has been rising sharply, 
the proportion of the urban workforce employed by FFEs has grown slightly. In 1994, 2.7 
percent of workers were employed by FFEs; in 1999, 3.7 percent; and in 2002, 4.56 
percent of workers were employed by FFEs (Table 4). By contrast, in 2002, State-owned 
industries employed over seven times more workers than FFEs and paid a slightly higher 
wage to their workers. Meanwhile, FFE industrial outputs were nine times greater than 
State-owned Industrial outputs, thereby implying excessive overstaffing in State-owned 
industries and high levels of inefficiency in the state sector.   
 
Foreign Funded Enterprise exports have increased rapidly. In 1995, exports made 
up 45.5 percent of total provincial exports and by 2002 that number rose to 58.8 percent. 
Refer to Table 5 for FFE province-wise breakdown of exports. Overall, the composition 
of exports by all forms of ownership has seen a decrease in primary goods from 9.8 
percent in 1990 to 3.9 percent in 1999, and an increase from 90.2 percent to 96.1 percent 
in manufactured goods over the same years (see the Table on Guangdong’s evolving 
economic structure).  
                                                          
8 State-owned and state-holding enterprises refer to state-owned enterprises and the enterprises in which the 
state holds a majority share.  
Collective-owned enterprises refer to industrial enterprises where the means of production are owned 
collectively, which have registered in accordance with the Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Management of Registration of Corporate Enterprises, including urban and rural enterprises invested by 
collectives and some enterprises which were formerly owned privately but have been registered in 
industrial and commercial administration agency as collective through raising funds from the public. 
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Guangdong Outputs, Exports, Workforce and Wages, 2002 
 Share of Output (%) Share of Exports (%) 




State-owned industry 6.8 46 32.3 18366 
Collective-owned 
enterprises 26.7 2.6 7 8403 
FFEs 61.4 50.7 4.6 17321 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003 
 
The structural composition of GDP has been changing in Guangdong since1980, 
with a marked decrease in primary industry’s share of GDP and a rise in the share of 
secondary and tertiary shares.9 In 1980, primary industry comprised 33.2 percent of 
provincial GDP, secondary industry 41.4 percent and tertiary industry 25.7 percent. In 
1990 and 2002, primary industry made up 24.7 percent and 8.8 percent of Guangdong’s 
GDP, respectively; secondary industry made up 24.7 percent and 50.4 percent, 
respectively; and tertiary industry made up 35.8 percent and 40.8 percent, respectively 
(Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003).  
 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan’s Investments in Guangdong 
 
Guangdong has strong ties to the overseas Chinese population. Roughly 19 
million overseas Chinese who have roots in Guangdong province have invested in 
Guangdong. Hong Kong is a prime example of how such ties have boosted FDI flows. In 
the early 1990s, 80 percent of Hong Kong’s population was said to have been born in 
Guangdong, or could trace its family roots to a neighboring province. This close 
relationship manifests itself in that Hong Kong is one of the biggest foreign investors in 
China. 
 
Investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) continues to play a key 
role in FDI in Guangdong. Over time, the proportion of FDI from HMT has decreased, as 
the province attracted more investment from other countries, but HMT still makes up 
more than half of FDI in Guangdong. In 1980, 87.4 percent of FDI came from HMT; in 
1990, 74.6 percent; in 1999, 65.1 percent; and in 2002, 56.7 percent of FDI in 
Guangdong was from HMT, while the remaining FDI came from other FFEs from around 
the world (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook for 2002 data).10  
 
Just as China was opening up in the late 1970s, the labor intensive manufacturing 
industry in Hong Kong was running out of space for expansion. At the time, Guangdong 
provided the perfect answer to Hong Kong’s industry and much of manufacturing 
                                                          
9 Primary industry refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery. Secondary industry refers 
to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas and 
construction. Tertiary industry refers to all other economic activities not included in primary or secondary 
industry.  
10Aside from HMT, there is no other region that dominates FDI into Guangdong. The top three investors in 
2002, other than HMT, were the Virgin Islands at 17.5 percent of FDI, the United Sates at 5.4 percent and 
the United Kingdom at 4.2 percent.  
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relocated to Guangdong. This symbiotic relationship has continued through decades, as 
Guangdong has grown into the manufacturing base that supports industries in Hong 
Kong. Guangdong had an abundant supply of labor to begin with. Over the years, as the 
growing industrial base absorbed the local workforce, labor from the hinterland stepped 
in to fill the higher demand. 
 
Composition of FDI in Guangdong 
 1980 1990 1999 2002 
FFE 12.6 % 25.4% 34.9% 43.3% 
HMT 87.4% 74.6% 76% 56.7% 
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, various issues .  
 
FFEs made up 61 percent of industrial output value in 2002. This number can be 
further disaggregated to reflect that over one-third, or 39 percent of the total FFE 
industrial output came from enterprises funded by entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003). For further details on share 
of value added of industry of FFEs by province, refer to Table 6.  
 
Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province 
 
a) A testing ground for policy 
 
In 1979, China’s “open door” policy gave way to a few open windows—the 
creation of SEZs. After three decades of pursuing a development strategy focused on 
heavy industrial build up and self-sufficiency under a central planning system proved 
unsuccessful, Chinese policy makers decided to experiment with market forces by 
establishing three SEZs in Guangdong Province in 1979. A fourth zone was established 
in 1980 in Fujian Province and Hainan Province in its entirety became an SEZ in 1988. 
(Refer to Appendix I). As a precautionary measure, these SEZs were established in 
backward areas with weak industrial bases and infrastructure. This way, if the policies 
within the zones failed, there would not be a large negative impact on the greater 
economy.  
 
The idea of SEZs was not new in 1979. Specialized export-processing zones and 
free trade zones date back to the 1960s.11 Many countries, particularly Asian ones, began 
experimenting with growth strategies which focused on export-led growth. The four 
Chinese SEZs, established in Shenzen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province, and 
Xiamen in Fujian Province were different in that they were broader in scope and in terms 
of enterprises that could be set up within them.  
 
These four Chinese SEZs were to serve as a testing ground for new economic 
policies. It was clear that policy needed to shift towards a market-driven economy, but 
imposing radical changes across the entire centrally-planned economy could be risky. By 
using the SEZs as a laboratory, policies could be tested on a smaller scale. Successful 
                                                          
11 According to UNCTAD (1982), the first EPZ and FTZ in the world were established in Mayagaez, Puerto Rico 
(1962) and Kandla, India (1965). 
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policies could perhaps later be integrated into national policy, while failures could be 
noted and learned from.  
 
Ge (1999) cites some experiments that were to be conducted in the SEZs beginning in the 
1980s. They included  
 
…attracting and utilizing foreign capital, acquiring advanced foreign production and 
managerial technologies, developing a comprehensive economic structure and promoting 
foreign trade in accordance with the comparative advantages of the region, and gaining 
experience in economic system reforms according to the international norm, namely the 
practice of market economies. 
 
Policy guidelines were put in place with the establishment of the SEZs. It was 
explicitly required that the zones maintain a trade surplus and the quantity of exports 
from the zones would serve as one of the measures of the zone’s level of openness. 
Foreign investment was to be the main source for physical capital and technologies, and 
the zones’ ability to attract this investment would serve as another measure of its 
openness and of its operation. It also encouraged that domestic firms operate alongside 
foreign firms to promote technology transfer and to form economic ties that could 
encourage growth.   
 
Since foreign investment was to play such a big role in the SEZs, various policies 
to attract FDI were put in place. Incentives for FDI included: duty-free privileges; 
concessionary tax rates, breaks, and exemptions; preferential fees for land or facility use; 
favorable arrangements with project duration, size, sector invested, location and the type 
of ownership; flexible treatments regarding business management, employment, and 
wage schemes; and so on. These policies, in conjunction with improved infrastructure, 
facilities, legal structure and administrative framework have created an investor-friendly 
environment that has led to the influx of billions of dollars of FDI from around the world. 
Industry, especially light industry, has attracted a large portion of FDI in the SEZs, in part 
because incentives were more generous for these projects. 
 
Another integral policy element that has attracted high levels of FDI is flexible 
arrangements with investors, practiced in processing and assembly trade, and 
compensation trade, among others. Some valuable inputs that the Chinese can offer to 
foreign firms include labor, land, facilities and raw materials. In negotiating contracts 
with foreign firms, the Chinese can look forward to acquisition of new technologies and 
equipment and to gaining a better-trained workforce, especially in management skills. 
Also, these arrangements allow for minimum foreign exchange requirements in the long 
term, while generating foreign exchange and employment in the short term. At the same 
time, foreign investors are encouraged by the flexible arrangements, as they can help 
them to manage risks and uncertainties ranging from the convertibility of local currency 
to the protection of patents and trade secrets. More recent policies have been 
experimenting with allowing foreign investors to partake in some infrastructure 
development and transportation and telecommunications projects, but policies and 
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regulations in this field are unsettled and need further development and clarity in order to 
attract more FDI.  
 
b) Shenzhen Special Economic Zone 
 
When the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was established in Guangdong in 
1979, it was little more than a small, agricultural town across the bay from Hong Kong. 
Prior to the expansion of the other SEZs, it was geographically largest in size at 327.7 
km.2 It had little infrastructure, negligible capacity for electric power generation and its 
workforce had little to offer in terms of skilled and semi-skilled labor. Its weak industrial 
base accounted for less than 20 percent of the provincial GDP and employed about one-
fourth of the province’s labor force. The little manufacturing that took place was 
concentrated into a few products. About 80 percent of households were engaged in 
agricultural and fishing activities. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the situation in the other SEZs of Guangdong was the same, 
if not worse. Undeveloped, rural areas such as Shenzhen were chosen intentionally by the 
government as testing zones for open-market policy as a precautionary measure. Should 
policies in these regions backfire, devastating effects would not be felt across the whole 
economy (Ge 1999). Clearly, given the weak starting point of the designated SEZs like 
Shenzhen, massive infusions of capital were needed to build capacity in the zone prior to 
having industries set up shop there.12  
 
Foreign investment and self-raised funds by the Shenzhen SEZ provided the 
largest sources of capital throughout the construction and operational phases. In 1980, 
foreign investment comprised 43.88 percent of total investment into Shenzhen SEZ, 
while self-raised funds made up 26.07 percent and state appropriations 23.88 percent. 
The proportion of state-appropriated funding decreased between 1980 and 1993, as did 
the share of funds from foreign investment. Meanwhile, the share of self-raised funds 
increased. In 1987 and 1993, respectively, the source of investment funds was: 16.73 and 
12.94 percent from foreign investment; 55.1 and 51.16 percent from self-raised funds; 
and 1.33 and zero percent from state appropriated funds (Ge, 1999).  
 
Today, the Shenzhen SEZ is 1949 km2 and boasts the highest GDP among the 
Guangdong SEZs.13 In 2002, its GDP was $2.8 billion. Primary, secondary and tertiary 
industries comprised .85 percent, 54.71 percent and 44.5 percent, respectively, of GDP 
(Main Economic Indicators of Shenzhen Table).  
 
Shenzhen’s exports in 2002 were $4.65 billion, or 1.4 percent of total national 
exports ($325.6 billion). Contracted foreign capital was $5.19 billion and foreign capital 
actually utilized was 4.9 billion USD (Main Economic Indicators of Shenzhen Table, 
Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003).  
 
                                                          
12 The construction phase in Shenzhen SEZ continued until 1985.  
13 In Guangdong, only the city of Guangzhou, which is three times the area of Shenzhen, has a higher GDP 
than Shenzhen.   
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The average wage in Shenzhen in 2002 was 28,218 Chinese Yuan, which was 
almost 1.5 times greater than the Guangdong Province-wide average wage for that year 
and 2.3 times greater than China’s national wage (Main Economic Indicators of 
Shenzhen Table, China Statistical Yearbook 2003, Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 
2003).  
   
 
Main Indicators of Shenzhen (2002) 
  
Item        Shenzhen 
Land Area (sq. km) 1949 
Area of Regularly Cultivated Land (ha.) 3549 
Total Year-end Population with Residence Registration (1000 
persons) 139.45 
Non-agricultural Population (1000 persons) 112.04 
Number of Employed Persons at the Year-end (1000 persons) 359.28 
Gross Domestic Product (100 million Yuan) 2256.82 
Primary Industry 19.06 
Secondary Industry 1234.69 
Industry 1076.55 
Tertiary Industry 1003.08 
Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (Yuan) 46388 
Index of Gross Domestic Product (preceding year = 100) 115 
Primary Industry 106.9 
Secondary Industry 117.6 
Industry 119.6 
Tertiary Industry 111.9 
Index of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product (preceding year = 100) 106.5 
Total Income of Township Enterprises (100 million Yuan) 307.9 
Total Length of Highways in Operation (km) 1385 
Total Business Volume of Postal and Telecommunication Services 
(at 2000 constant prices) (100 million Yuan) 181.88 
Number of Telephone Sets Owned by Residents (1000 units) 286.75 
Rural Areas 95.3 
Total Amount of Investment in Fixed Assets (100 million Yuan) 747.15 
Investment in Capital Construction 286.11 
Investment in Innovation 38.51 
Invested by State-owned Units 202.86 
Invested by Collective-owned Units 57.63 
Total Amount of Retail Sales of Consumer Goods (100 million 
Yuan) 689.59 
Transaction Value of Free Markets in Urban and Rural Areas (100 
million Yuan) 272.81 
Total Amount of Exports (USD 100 million) 465.42 
Total Amount of Imports (USD 100 million) 406.74 
Utilization of Foreign Capital through Newly Signed Contracts  
Contracted Foreign Capital (USD 100 million) 51.86 
Foreign Capital Actually Utilized (USD 100 million) 49.02 
Local Government Budgetary Revenue (100 million Yuan) 265.93 
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Local Government Budgetary Expenditure (100 million Yuan) 307.78 
Savings Deposits by Urban and Rural Residents at the Year-end (100 
million Yuan) 1756.49 
Per Capita Annual Disposable Income of Urban Residents (Yuan) 21914 
Per Capita Annual Net Income of Rural Residents (Yuan) 10610 
Average Wage of Staff and Workers (Yuan) 28218 
 
Note: Primary industry refers to agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery.  
Secondary industry refers to mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, 
water and gas and construction.  
Industry refers to the material production sector which is engaged in extraction of natural resources and 
processing and reprocessing of minerals and agricultural products.  
Tertiary industry refers to all other economic activities not included in primary or secondary industry.  
Source: Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2003 
 
 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang: 
 
The Yangzi River Delta, with Shanghai at its core, is another prominent 
destination for FDI, second only to Guangdong province. However, it has taken an 
entirely different route, creating a provincial economy with a different structure. In the 
1970s, Shanghai already occupied a central role in the Chinese economy – it was the 
largest contributor to national income, revenue and GDP. The Chinese government had 
invested heavily in the province, with State-owned Enterprises accounting for 91.1% of 
the region’s industrial output. The region’s significance to the national economy was a 
strong incentive for the Chinese government to maintain a strong control over the 
economic model, even while other regions were being opened up to foreign cooperation, 
meaning that Shanghai had a late start in the FDI game.  
 
It was only in the late 1980s that Shanghai witnessed the first recognizable flows 
of FDI. Even then, they were intended for the tourism sector. Only in the early 1990s did 
FDI for manufacturing and services pick up substantially. Shanghai’s increasing political 
clout with the Chinese government was partly responsible for this upward trend. 
Shanghai was China’s leading financial center even before the reforms were put in place. 
By being one of the first states to open up the service sector to foreign participation, 
Shanghai served as the first stop in China for several global financial services firms, 
further cementing its leadership position as a financial hub. Shanghai is gradually 
emerging from being a financial hub for FFEs in the neighboring provinces, particularly 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, to serving as a hub for FFEs in the entire Chinese economy, a role 
that will pit it against Hong Kong. 
 
Today, tertiary-sector FFEs occupy an important position in Shanghai’s economy; 
a result of the provincial city’s pioneering efforts to open up its service sector to foreign 
investments. The city’s manufacturing sector is split into export-oriented small scale 
industries, and large, capital intensive plants that seek local markets. Shanghai’s 
relatively prosperous economy has bestowed enough purchasing power upon the local 
population to make it attractive for foreign companies to set up market-seeking local 
production facilities. 
 
Gradually though, the city’s service sector is edging out labor-intensive 
manufacturing activity to the periphery, in some cases even causing factories to relocate 
to the cheaper neighboring provinces of Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Not only have these 
provinces benefited from spillover of manufacturing activity, but also from easy access to 
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Shanghai’s financial services sector. This combination has spurred tremendous growth in 
manufacturing FFEs in these provinces, so much so much so that export-oriented FFEs in 
Jiangsu, the northern province, now account for a higher proportion of the province’s 
output than FFEs in Guangdong. Sixty two percent of Jiangsu’s exports came from FFEs 
in 2002. In short, FFEs have played a critical role in promoting exports from China’s 
coastal provinces (refer to Table 7). 
 
 
FDI Regime & Incentives: 
Fiscal Incentives 
 
China’s general policy on incentives is expected to undergo a major overhaul in the near 
future. The urgency is in part because of China’s accession to the WTO. A uniform tax 
policy, applicable to state enterprises and foreign enterprises, is likely to replace the 
current tax incentives for FFEs, which pay 15 percent as opposed to 33 percent and 53 
percent for domestic and State-owned Enterprises, respectively. The increasing gap in 
economic prosperity of SEZs, open cities and other inland regions has triggered this 
change in tax policy. Options being considered by the government would eliminate 
preferential treatment for FFEs in economic zones, applying the same tax rate, expected 
to range between 15 percent and 33 percent, to all enterprises. Policy reform aimed at 
equalizing the treatment of domestic and foreign capital has substantially reduced the 
incentive for round-tripping, in particular the ongoing reduction of tax incentives for FDI 
and, more generally, the gradual movement towards a national treatment-based regulatory 
regime governing investment. 
 
China’s uniform tax policy would signal the end of tax subsidies, though only for 
new entrants. Contracts signed before uniform tax policy is enacted will continue to be 
honored. To maintain the competitiveness of SEZs, the government intends to take 
measures that will open up these zones to even higher levels of foreign participation. 
Specifically, the government is considering opening up prized sectors that until now were 
heavily regulated, such as insurance and finance, and enhancing the regulation for FFEs 





The Chinese government offers a host of incentives to FFEs, mainly in the form of 
tax subsidies. Research is supportive of using tax subsidies to lure foreign companies into 
a region with inadequate infrastructure, with a planned elimination of subsidies over time 
as infrastructure falls into place. 
 
? Capital Expansion: An increase in capital investments earns FFEs a tax holiday 
for two years, and a 50 percent reduction in income tax for another three years. 
Investments in western and interior regions offer higher incentives. These 
incentives are available only for investments in industries classified as 
“encouraged,” and if the capital base is expanded to at least $60 million, or $15 
million if the increase is 50 percent or more. 
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? Access to Loans: FFEs can avail of fixed-asset loans, working-capital loans, and 
accounts receivable financing from The Bank of China. Local currency loans are 
offered at the same interest offered to State-owned Enterprises. 
 
? Economic and Technological Development Zones: To encourage investment in 
research and development, China had established 56 ETDZs as of February 2003. 
Membership of these zones, restricted to FFEs deemed to be “technologically 
advanced,” earns certain tax reductions and exemptions. An additional 50 percent 
tax reduction is granted to “technologically advanced” FFEs that choose to locate 
outside such zones. 
 
? Reinvestment: All FFEs receive a 40 percent tax refund on profits that are 




China encourages investments in certain industries, particularly the ones that are seen 
driving the future growth of the country. Thus, certain incentives are offered to FFEs 
operating in chosen industries. 
 
? FFEs with a production contract of at least ten years are entitled to a standard 
two-year tax exemption, followed by a 50 percent reduction for another three 
years. 
 
? FFEs invested in agriculture, forestry or animal husbandry are entitled for an 
additional ten-year 15-30 percent tax reduction. 
 




Special Economic Zones: 
 
During the 1980s, the Chinese government passed several stages, ranging from 
the establishment of SEZs and open coastal cities and areas, to designating open inland 
and coastal ETDZs. Since 1980, China has established SEZs in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and 
Shantou in Guangdong Province, Xiamen in Fujian Province, and designated the entire 
province of Hainan an SEZ. 
 
In August 1980, the National People's Congress (NPC) passed "Regulations for 
The Special Economy Zone of Guangdong Province" and officially designated a portion 
of Shenzhen as the Shenzhen Special Economy Zone (SSEZ).” In 1984, China further 
opened 14 coastal cities to overseas investment. These were: Dalian, Qinhuangdao, 
Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, 
Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai. 
 
Since 1988, mainland China's opening to the outside world has been extended to 
its border areas, areas along the Yangzi River and inland areas. First, the State decided to 
turn Hainan Island into mainland China's biggest SEZ and then to enlarge the other four 
SEZs. Shortly afterwards, the State Council expanded the open coastal areas, extending 
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into an open coastal belt the open economic zones of the Yangzi River Delta, Pearl River 
Delta, Xiamen-Zhangzhou-Quanzhou Triangle in south Fujian, Shandong Peninsula, 
Liaodong Peninsula (Liaoning Province), Hebei and Guangxi. 
 
In June 1990, the Chinese government opened the Pudong New Area in Shanghai 
to overseas investment, and additional cities along the Yangzi River valley, with 
Shanghai's Pudong New Area as its "dragon head." Since 1992, the State Council has 
opened a number of border cities, and in addition, opened all the capital cities of inland 
provinces and autonomous regions. In addition, 15 free trade zones, 32 state-level 
economic and technological development zones, and 53 new-and high-tech industrial 
development zones have been established in large and medium-sized cities. As these 
open areas adopt different preferential policies, they play the dual roles of "windows" in 
developing the foreign-oriented economy, generating foreign exchanges through 
exporting products and importing advanced technologies, and of "radiators" in 
accelerating inland economic development.  
 
Primarily geared to exporting processed goods, the five SEZs are foreign-oriented 
areas which integrate science and industry with trade, and benefit from preferential 
policies and special managerial systems. In 1999, Shenzhen's new-and high-tech industry 
became the one with the best prospects, and the output value of new-and high-tech 
products reached 81.98 billion Yuan, making up 40.5 percent of the city's total industrial 
output value. In the initial years, in order to create a competitive economic environment, 
preferential policies were put in place for potential investors in the SEZs (refer to the 
SEZ preferential policies table below). In 1980, the corporate tax rate for SEZs was set at 
only 15 percent at a time when tax rates elsewhere went up to as high as 55 percent for 
domestic firms and 40 percent for foreign firms. Foreign investors received extra tax 
benefits of two years of exemption from the date when the firm started to generate 
profits, followed by a 50 percent tax reduction for another three years. 
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Major Preferential Policies for SEZs in China 
 
General Guide-Lines Corporate Tax Individual Income Tax, Property 
Tax & Land Usage 
Import/Export Duties 
1. Foreign Capital is the 
major source for 
development fund. 
 
2. Economic activities 
depend on market forces, 
rather than the state plan. 
 
3. Local governments 





4. Special treatment for 
enterprises in SEZs: tax 
holiday or reduced tax 
rates, accelerated 
depreciation rates 
(generally 5-10 years), 
flexible policies on 
imports and exports. 
 
5. The amounts of fiscal 
revenues and foreign 
exchange earnings to be 
transferred to the central 
government are fixed, 
revenue or earnings 
above the quota belong 
to the local governments. 
 
6. Capital or profits of 
foreign investors are free 
to flow in and out of the 
country.  
1. Corporate tax rate is 
15% for enterprises 
located in the SEZs. No 
additional local tax. 
 
2. Profit reinvested in 
the SEZs are exempt 
from corporate tax upon 
application. 
 
3. Enterprises with 
foreign investment 
enjoy 1 to 3 year 
corporate tax exemption 
(counting from the date 
when firms have 
positive profits), and 
50% reduction of 
corporate tax for 
additional 3 years. 
 
4. Enterprises that 
export more than 70% 
of their products are 
allowed 10% reduction 
in corporate tax.  
 
5. Business incomes of 
banks and insurance 
companies are exempt 
from industrial and 
commercial 
consolidated taxes for 5 
years from their 
establishment. After the 
5-year exemption 
period, the tax rate is 
3%.  
Individual income tax: 
1. 50% of the individual 
income generated in the SEZs 
that is subject to Individual 
Income Tax Law of the 
People’s Republic of China is 
exempt from the individual 
income tax.  
 
2. Interest income of non-
citizenship is exempt from 
individual income tax until 
1995. (It is not known whether 
it is still in effect.) 
 
Property tax: 
Foreign investors are exempt 
from property taxes for three 
to five years to the real estate 
property that they newly 
bought or built. 
 
Land usage: 
1. Land is leased to foreign 
investors up to 70 years.  
 
2. Land use fees are reduced 
or exempt for 1-5 years 
depending on various 
situations: used for business 
operation, or for production; if 
it introduces high technology; 
and whether or not it is 
developed land.  
1. Import duties are exempt 
for equipment, parts, raw 
materials, transportation 
vehicles, and other production 
materials purchased by 
enterprises located in the SEZs 
for production purposes. (This 
policy was phased out starting 
in 1995.) 
 
2. Daily necessity goods used 
for consumption purposes, 
except cigarettes and wines, 
are exempt from import duties. 
 
3. Exports of goods produced 
in the SEZs with domestic 
materials, except for raw oil or 
oil products or other products 
that the state has specified, are 
exempt from industrial and 
commercial consolidated taxes 
(and export duties?). 
 
4. Exports of goods produced 
in the SEZs with imported 
materials are exempt from 
industrial and commercial 
consolidated taxes.  
 
Sources: Regulations on SEZs in Guangdong Province in A Comprehensive Book of Laws and Regulations 
of the People’s Republic of China, 1995; China’s Special Economic Zones and Technological 
Development Yearbook.  
 
To promote exports, an additional 10 percent tax reduction had been set up for 
firms that exported more than 70 percent of their products, and export duties are also 
exempt for goods produced in the SEZs. Import duties were exempt for equipment, parts, 
materials used for production purposes, and daily necessities used for consumption 
purposes. To show the government’s determination and commitment to the SEZ policies, 
land was leased to foreign investors for up to 50 years (later on, it was extended to a 
maximum of 70 years). Land usage fees were set very low, and were exempt or reduced 
from one to five years. Property taxes were also exempt for three to five years to 
 22
encourage foreign investors. To attract people to work in the SEZs, individual income 
taxes were reduced by 50 percent of the national level; in addition, the interest income of 
foreigners was exempted from individual income tax. Labor mobility was also 
encouraged right from the beginning. Professionals or highly-skilled workers were 
allowed to move to work in the SEZs, regardless of the rigid household registry system. 
Workers were allowed to move from company to company, and firm managers had the 
right to pay employees according to their merit and even fire them, if necessary. 
 
In addition to five SEZs, China has established a variety of economic zones, as 
mentioned earlier, each targeted at a specific industry. ETDZs, of which there were 56 in 
number as of February 2003, have been set up to encourage foreign investments in 
research and development. To target the high-tech industry, China has established 
National High-Tech Parks. Free Trade Zones, located along the coast, have become a 
popular location for export-oriented enterprises as they offer facilities such as speedy 
customs clearance, like duty-free entrance for all goods. All products manufactured in 
these zones must be exported. 
 
SEZs, however, are not the only method that the Chinese government has 
employed to attract foreign investment, as cities such as Shanghai, Dalian, Guangzhou, 
Tianjin and Beijing have been allowed to employ policies similar to the SEZs to attract 
foreign investors. Hainan Island – previously under the jurisdiction of Guangdong 
province – was made a separate province in 1988, and in effect functions as a free-trade 
zone. In 1990, the Pudong development zone –similar to an SEZ – was established in 
Shanghai. The explosive growth of the SEZs in southern China is a result of wholesale 
movement of labor-intensive industries from Hong Kong and Taiwan, which were losing 
their comparative advantage in these industries, to mainland China. China was closer, 
wages were lower, and language difficulties were nonexistent, compared with the 
alternative sites in Southeast Asia. Managers could commute daily from Hong Kong to 
supervise their factories in Shenzhen. The family connections greatly reduced the 
transaction costs of the investment by providing reliable local supervisors, inside 
information on the enforcement of regulations, and contacts with the local authorities. 
 
Manufactured goods comprised some 90 percent of total export value in 1999, 
compared with 50 percent in 1980. Higher value, technology-intensive manufactured 
goods now form a higher percentage of total exports. For instance, the export of apparel 
and clothing accessories, which accounted for 15.4 percent of total exports in 1999, is 
losing ground to machinery and transport equipment, which accounted for 30.2 percent. 
Export-processing foreign-invested enterprises achieved the most impressive results in 
export performance, accounting for 45.5 percent of total exports in 1999 compared to 
only 27.5 percent in 1993. Contributions made by State-owned Enterprises, in contrast, 







When the FDI flows began in the late 1970s, China still depended on planned 
labor allocation. Consequently, foreign enterprises had to depend on FESCO, a 
government controlled agency, for their labor needs. For some time, FESCO enjoyed a 
monopoly, leading to inefficient labor allocation. 
 
However, over time, FESCO lost its monopoly and a labor market evolved, 
especially as the higher education system and vocational schools released a supply of 
skilled laborers into the market. In 1985, State-owned Enterprises were given the right to 
hire and fire workers. Now, FFEs are free to hire in a competitive labor market, and can 
even using incentives such as sign-on bonuses and employee stock options. 
 
China passed its national labor law in 1994, which applies to all work units, 
irrespective of ownership. In conjunction with FFE labor regulations, national labor law 
oversees all labor issues for FFE in China. Surprisingly, the national law ruled against 
dismissals of redundant employees on grounds other than imminent bankruptcy and 
major production changes. Earlier regulations, permitting dismissals resulting from 
technical and production changes, had granted greater flexibility to the employers. Even 
the autonomy, granted to FFEs by earlier regulations, to hire was reduced, as FFEs are 
now required to seek permission from local authorities before hiring from other regions. 
 
 
Entry & Exit Policies: 
 
 With the abolition of industrial licensing in India in 1991, the entry barriers for 
firms were removed. However, exit barriers remained and continue until today. In fact, 
the lack of an exit policy has itself become an entry barrier as far as India is concerned. 
By contrast, in China, firms are free to enter and exit as their conditions demand. 
 
India – China comparisons: 
 
The table below (World Bank, 2003) provides a snapshot of the business climate 
in India and China by identifying specific regulations and policies that encourage or 
discourage investment, productivity, and growth. Key indicators are used to help measure 
the ease or difficulty of operating a business: starting a business, hiring and firing 
workers, enforcing contracts, getting credit, and closing a business. The data show clearly 
the extraordinary costs of closing a business, and the relatively high costs of opening a 
business in India. 
 
In (Blaxill and Maira, 2000) a high quality sample of 28 executives in large, 
multinational companies in Europe, North America, and Asia were interviewed to 
understand the factors that business people consider, and criteria they use, when deciding 
to make investments, especially when comparing India and China. 
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Snapshot of Business Climates in India and China, 2003 
Indicator India China 
OECD 
Average 
Starting a Business    
Number of procedures 10 11 7 
Duration (days) 88 46 30 
Cost (% of GNI per capita) 49.8 14.3 10.2 
Min. Capital (% of GNI per capita) 430.4 3855.9 61.2 
Hiring and Firing Workers    
Flexibility of Hiring Index 33 17 49 
Conditions of Employment Index 75 67 58 
Flexibility of Firing Index 45 57 28 
Employment Laws Index 51 47 45 
Enforcing Contracts    
Number of procedures 22 20 17 
Duration (days) 365 180 233 
Cost (% of GNI per capita) 95 32 7.1 
Procedural Complexity Index 50 52 49 
Getting Credit    
Public Credit Registry operates? No Yes  
Year Public Credit Registry established - 1999  
Public Credit Registry coverage (borrowers per 1000 capita) 0 3 43.2 
Public Credit Registry Index 0 56 58 
Private Credit Bureau operates? No No  
Private Credit Bureau coverage (borrowers per 1000 capita) 0 0 443.5 
Creditor Rights Index 3 2 1 
Closing a Business    
Actual time (in years) 11.3 2.6 1.8 
Actual cost (% of estate) 8 18 7 
Goals of Insolvency Index 21 51 77 
Court Powers Index 33 67 36 
Economy Characteristics    
Region South Asia East Asia and Pacific 
Income category Low income Lower middle income 
Legal origin English German  
GNI per capita (US$) 480 940 23135 
Informal economy (% GNI) 23.1 13.1 16.8 
Population 1,032,354,634 1,271,849,984 41,068,094 







In comparing the two, the majority (55 percent respondents) commented on the process of obtaining the 
required decisions from the Government machinery. Almost all of them said that the process was much 
more effective in China, with some drawing a quite stark contrast in China’s favor. There were only two 
exceptions: both in the infrastructure sectors. One of these said the Indian process was a little quicker, and 
the other that both were equally slow but the Chinese stuck to their decisions once taken. Some other 
companies also said that the process took as long in China as in India but even these companies said that in 
China once the decisions were taken they were firm, whereas in India decisions were often changed. The 
majority said that the process was actually much faster in China. And some commented that since they 
were in partnership with Government-owned companies in China, they did not have to hassle with the 
Government machinery at all! 
 
Skill levels: 
The next most often cited factor in comparing the two countries was skill levels (22 percent of companies). 
All of them said that India was fairly well ahead of China. They commented very favorably on Indian 
managers as well as the high levels of technical skills. In the case of China, although there was great 
respect for the commercial and technical energy of the Chinese people, some executives expressed the view 
that China was still developing the skills required to manage a modern economy and that those skills were 
often scarce. In India, by contrast, there was a great and underutilized people resource base that provided 
important advantages to Indian operations. 
 
Legal system and business culture: 
Other factors were the legal system (17 percent of companies) and the business culture (also 17 percent). 
On both these, India was ahead of China in the views if all those who mentioned them. However, some did 
say that the legal system in India was a mixed blessing, in that one could get caught in lengthy litigation.  
 
Market size and potential: 
Market size was mentioned by 17 percent, all in favor of China. These companies tended to group China 
and India together in their corporate strategies. They have similar characteristics: the world’s largest, 
emerging markets with low average per capita income levels and promising futures. Along each dimension, 
China scores above India, with larger markets, slightly higher income levels (especially in the coastal 
cities) and higher projected growth. If forced to make a choice between the two countries, almost all would 
choose China as the preferred location for investment. Some had already done so, by investing in China but 
not India, whereas one company was pulling out of India while maintaining its investment in China. 
 
Making Profits: 
17 percent also mentioned the ability to generate profits, which must be at the end of the day a key measure 
of attractiveness of a market. The experience of our respondents is very mixed in China so far. Some have 
begun to make profits and some continue to lose money. China has developed a reputation with some of the 
companies as a place where substantial over-investment has led to excess capacity and heavy price-cutting. 
But even the losers say they are in for the long haul because of the attractiveness of the market. 
                                                          
14 Blaxill and Maira (2000) in Sachs and Bajpai, “Foreign Direct Investment in India: How Can $10 Billion in Annual 
Inflows Be Realized”, a report prepared for the Minister of Commerce & Industry, Government of India. 
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Some Impediments to Greater FDI Flows at the State Level: 
 
1. Lack of Decision-Making Authority with the State Governments 
 
In India, the reform process so far has mainly been concentrated at the central 
level. India has yet to free up its state governments sufficiently so that they can add 
greater dynamism to the reforms. In most key infrastructure areas, the central government 
remains in control, or at least with veto power over state actions. Greater freedom to the 
states will help foster greater competition among themselves. The state governments in 
India need to be viewed as potential agents of rapid and salutary change.  
 
Brazil, China, and Russia are examples where regional governments take the lead 
in pushing reforms and prompting further actions by the central government. In Brazil, it 
is São Paulo and Minais Gerais which are the reform leaders at the regional level; in 
China, it is the coastal provinces, and the provinces farthest from Beijing, in the lead; in 
Russia, reform leaders in Nizhny Novgorod and in the Russian Far East have been major 
spurs to reforms at the central level.   
In China’s case, the two disastrous leftist campaigns, the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-62) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), undermined belief in Marxist dogmas, 
weakened the state's administrative capacity, and discredited central planning. The Great 
Leap Forward program of crash industrialization starved around 30 million to death in the 
1958-61 period, and the Cultural Revolution purged about 60 percent of party officials. 
The legacy of these two disasters enabled Deng Xiaoping to quickly transfer a 
significant amount of formal and informal economic policymaking power and resources 
to the provinces when he returned to power in 1978. The central ministerial and party 
apparatus were too politically exhausted and too discredited to resist his decentralization. 
This ending of Beijing's stranglehold over political power has been fundamental to the 
continuation of economic reforms. 
One major example of decentralization in economic policy making in China was 
that all trade was initially handled at the federal level by the State Trading Corporation 
(STC). However, in the mid-1980s, provinces were allowed to set up a provincial trading 
corporation. Later, more trading corporations were established and competed with one 
another. Finally, the provinces allowed firms to export directly. Similarly, another 
example was the mechanism adopted by the federal government to collect taxes. 
Provinces were given tax quotas, which meant that they had to collect a certain amount 
every year, but that any collection above the fixed quota could be kept by the provinces, 
thereby building in an incentive for the provinces to collect higher levels of revenue. 
However, with the introduction of VAT in 1994, this system was discontinued.15 
 
 
                                                          
15 Wing Thye Woo provided this information.  
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2. Limited Scale of EPZs and SEZs 
 
The very modest contributions of India’s export processing zones in attracting 
FDI and overall export development call for a policy revision. India’s export processing 
zones have lacked dynamism because of several reasons, such as their relatively limited 
scale; the Government’s general ambivalence about attracting FDI; the unclear and 
changing incentive packages attached to the zones; and the power of the central 
government in the regulation of the zones, in comparison with the major responsibility of 
local and provincial government in China. Ironically, while India established her first free 
trade zone, as mentioned earlier, in Kandla, Gujarat in 1965 compared with China’s 
initial efforts in 1979, the Indian zones never seemed to take off — either in attracting 
investments or in promoting exports. 
 
It must be pointed out here that the Government of India has introduced an 
Export/Import Policy effective April 2000 for setting up SEZs in the country with a view 
to provide an internationally competitive and hassle free environment for exports.16 Units 
may be set up in an SEZ for manufacturing goods and rendering services. All the 
import/export operations of the SEZ units will be on a self-certification basis. The units 
in the zone have to be net-foreign-exchange earners, but they shall not be subjected to 
any pre-determined value addition or minimum export performance requirements. Sales 
in the Domestic Tariff Area by SEZ units shall be subject to payment of full customs 
duties and import duty in force. Further offshore banking units may be set up in the SEZs. 
 
The policy provides for setting up SEZs in the public, private, or joint sectors or by State 
Governments. It was also envisaged that some of the existing Export EPZs would be 
converted into SEZs. Accordingly, the Government has converted Export Processing 
zones located at Kandla and Surat (Gujarat), Cochin (Kerala), Santa Cruz (Mumbai-
Maharashtra), Falta (West Bengal), Madras (Tamil Nadu), Visakhapatnam (Andhra 
Pradesh) and Noida (Uttar Pradesh) into SEZs. In addition, approval has been given to 
establish 21 SEZs in various parts of the country in the private/joint sectors or by the 
State. As of March 2003, there were 659 units in operation in the 8 functional SEZs in 
India. Investment by the units in these zones was of the order of Rs.100566.20 million. 
The SEZ units provide employment to about 86,646 persons. 
 
3. No Liberalization in Exit Barriers 
 
While the reforms implemented so far have helped remove the entry barriers, the 
liberalization of exit barriers has yet to take place. In our view, this is a major deterrent to 
large volumes of FDI flowing to India. An exit policy needs to be formulated such that 
firms can enter and exit freely from the market. While it would be incorrect to ignore the 
                                                          
16 Based on the research work and recommendations of Bajpai and Sachs, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, 
Government of India announced new initiatives in India's Export/Import Policy for the year 2000/01. These relate to 
setting up SEZs and the involvement of India's State Governments in the country's export promotion effort  For details 
of the new policy, please access the Ministry's web site at: http://dgftcom.nic.in/exim/2000/  For Harvard's research, 
please see HIID DDP No. 641 "Strengthening India's Strategy for Economic Growth".  
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need and potential merit of certain safeguards, it is also important to recognize that 
safeguards if wrongly designed and/or poorly enforced would turn into barriers that may 
adversely affect the health of the firm.  The regulatory framework, which is in place, does 
not allow the firms to undertake restructuring. 
 
4. Stringent Labor Laws 
 
Large firms in India are not allowed to retrench or layoff any workers, or close 
down the unit without the permission of the state government. While the law was enacted 
with a view to monitor unfair retrenchment and layoff, in effect it has turned out to be a 
provision for job security in privately owned large firms. This is very much in line with 
the job security provided to public sector employees. Most importantly, the continuing 
barrier to the dismissal of unwanted workers in Indian establishments with 100 or more 
employees paralyzes firms in hiring new workers17. With regard to labor regulations and 
hiring and firing practices, India is ranked way below in the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2003. Labor-intensive manufacturing exports require competitive and flexible 
enterprises that can vary their employment according to changes in market demand and 
changes in technology, so India remains an unattractive base for such production in part 




Delays in decision making due to the multiplicity of agencies at the federal and 
state levels, the plethora of rules, and the bureaucratic mind-set of the many officials who 
have to be approached for permissions has been most frequently cited as a major obstacle 
to investment. The attitude towards foreign companies of many of the people whose 
clearance is required makes the process even more aggravating. Navigation is much 
easier in China where when the provincial government makes a decision it can see it 
through quickly to the end, unlike in India. The federal/state governments must find ways 
to simplify and speed up decision-making processes. While consolidation of regulatory 
agencies for a sector, and “single window” clearance procedures are beginning to 
improve the situation in India, much more needs to be done, and quickly, to reduce the 
bureaucratic tangles that many other foreign business continue to experience in India. 




The abysmal condition of the roads, power and ports is very frequently raised by 
potential investors as a major deterrent to higher FDI flows. It is pointed out that the 
condition of the infrastructure not only affects the operations of the business, but 
tarnishes the image of the country/state for potential investors in a very tangible way. The 
condition of international airports, the roads from airports into cities, and the 
interruptions of power supply, for instance, are major issues of concern. 
                                                          
17 According to the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), 1947 if a firm employs 100 or more workers, then workers cannot be 
laid-off without the prior permission of the concerned state government.  Besides, the Act prohibits closure unless of 
course the state government has granted approval to do so. 
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Improvement of the infrastructure is of course a priority for the government. However, 
improving the infrastructure of the state at large may take a fairly long time. It would be 
pragmatic to concentrate initially on improving the infrastructure for communications, 
uninterrupted power supply, and easy access to transport in smaller zones of the state. 
Major projects with foreign investment, especially export-intensive and knowledge-
intensive projects, could be initially concentrated in these zones. The success of these 
ventures would have many benefits that could percolate to the rest of the state.  
 
7. Finding Partners for Joint Ventures 
 
The plethora of regulations and agencies make it difficult for a foreign investor to 
navigate in India. A good local partner can be a skilled guide. Invariably, those who have 
succeeded in India have a fine local partner. These local partners have taught the foreign 
companies how to get things done in India without yielding to corrupt practices.  
 
8. Leveraging India’s Educated Work Force 
 
Focus on a few selected sectors will help Gujarat/India to leverage its comparative 
advantages and investors to realize the benefits. India’s highly educated and skilled, 
English-speaking manpower is a major strength of India. Even companies that have come 
to India to sell to the domestic market have established valuable flows of software, 
products, and people to support their international operations. This is a modern India that 
exports knowledge-intensive products, whereas the traditional India continues to produce 
and export some of the finest handicrafts. 
 
This is one area in which India scores over China. India’s visible success in the 
software business is of course one manifestation of this strength. But foreign companies 
in the engineering industries can also leverage Indian engineering and production 
capabilities to source precision components for their international operations. India could 
be a significant player in higher value-added exports, in which so far it has a factor 
advantage over all other developing countries including China. Of course, in all such 
knowledge-intensive sectors, protection of intellectual property rights becomes a concern 
for both foreign and Indian business people. The Government must move faster and with 
more clarity to comply with international standards of protection. The uncertainty on this 
vital issue is making investors hold back, in the pharmaceutical industry for example, and 
a valuable window of opportunity could be closing for India, even though it is still ahead 




Indian states, especially those on the coast could have achieved what Chinese 
coastal provinces have achieved in the growth of exports, in attracting large sums of FDI, 
and in creating large scale employment opportunities, but India failed in basic policy 
strategy. China’s export growth was based on core policy and economic management 
decisions carried out beginning in the early 1980s. These can be summarized as follows. 
First, China understood that the root of export growth would be diversification away from 
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traditional sectors, especially raw materials, into non-traditional sectors, especially 
manufactured goods. But China lacked the technology by itself to be competitive in 
manufactured goods. Therefore, it invited foreign direct investors to provide the capital 
and the expertise to achieve export competitiveness in a wide range of sectors, including 
electronics, apparel, plastic toys, stuffed animals, ceramics, and many other labor-
intensive sectors. In each sector, the key was to link foreign investor capital and expertise 
with a large and low-cost Chinese labor force. The foreign investors brought in the 
product design, specialized machine tools and capital goods, key intermediate products, 
and knowledge of world marketing channels. The Chinese assured these foreign investors 
certain key conditions for profitability, such as low taxes, reliable infrastructure, physical 
security, adequate power, decent logistics for the import and export of goods, and so 
forth. 
 
At the center of China’s export strategy were the SEZs in which favorable export 
conditions were assured. These SEZs along China’s coastline were designed to give 
foreign investors and domestic enterprises favorable conditions for rapid export 
promotion. All key aspects of the export environment were secured. Exporters, for 
example, were allowed to import intermediate products and capital goods duty free. They 
were given generous tax holidays. The exporters were assured decent physical 
infrastructure, often through the provision of land, power, physical security, and transport 
to the ports, within specially created industrial parks.   
 
India too has experimented with special zones, mainly export processing zones 
(EPZs), but one has to say that India’s approach to export zones has been one of relative 
neglect rather than support. China’s five main special economic zones (Shenzen, Zhuhai, 
Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan) exported $21.3 billion in 1999,18 roughly 11 percent of 
the national total. On the other hand, India’s eight functional SEZs (Kandla, Santacruz, 
Noida, Madras, Vishakhapatnam, Cochin, Surat, and Falta), managed a tiny fraction of 
that, both in absolute levels and as a proportion of total Indian exports.19 India’s EPZs 
have not performed as well as China’s SEZs for many reasons, including:  
 
1. limited scale and overcrowding of the EPZs 
2. insufficient logistical links with airports and seaports 
3. poor infrastructure in areas surrounding the zones (e.g. unpaved roads and poor 
physical security) 
4. government ambivalence and red tape regarding inward foreign direct investment 
5. unclear incentive packages governing inward investment, and 
6. lack of interest and authority of state and local governments, and the private sector, 
compared with the central government, in the design, set up, and functioning of the 
zones. 
 
Gujarat is not rated as one of the most attractive destinations for FDI in India, 
perhaps ranked around 5th or 6.th It is interesting to note that while Gujarat is perhaps next 
only to Maharashtra as far as attracting domestic private investment is concerned, it does 
                                                          
18 http://www.chamber.org.hk/info/daily_business_news/china/chi00021101.htm 
19 In 2000/01, exports from India’s eight SEZs were $1.8 billion, roughly around 4.1% of national exports.  
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not score as well when it comes to foreign direct investment. This issue needs to be 
looked at from several different angles. For instance, is the State doing enough on the 
marketing front, not just in the U.S., but in other parts of the western world; have there 
been any exercises undertaken to understand what the issues and concerns of MNCs are 
when it comes to investing in Gujarat; are the investment incentives offered by the State 
in line with others, such as Maharashtra or Tamil Nadu? Perhaps a strategy focusing on 
the comparative advantages of Gujarat, relative to its other competitor states in India, 
needs to be put in place that highlights for multinationals why they should consider 
investing in Gujarat if investments are planned in sectors where the state is comparatively 
better placed than other leading Indian states. 
 
Gujarat is one of the front runner states of India as far as some of the 
manufacturing sectors, such as engineering goods, chemical and petrochemical products, 
drugs and pharmaceuticals, and fertilizers, among others are concerned. However, it is 
essential that the state focuses much more than in the past on labor-intensive 
manufacturing production for exports. The potential for attracting much higher volumes 
of FDI, especially in Gujarat’s SEZs is enormous. This will not only bring in greater FDI 
flows, but will also raise exports from Gujarat and create large-scale employment 
opportunities. 
 
In China, the major responsibility for the SEZs rests with local and provincial 
governments, whereas in India, the responsibilities still remain heavily with Delhi.  
India’s export environment suffers from several other institutional weaknesses. India’s 
labor laws, noted unfavorably in several Global Competitiveness Reports, make it very 
costly to fire workers in enterprises of more than 100 workers. The result is that formal-
sector firms (those that are registered and that pay their taxes) are loath to take on new 
employment, and the vast majority of India’s employment is informal, in small, tax-
evading, inefficient enterprises. Equally remarkably, India’s legislation continues to 
restrict the entry of large firms, or the growth of small firms into large firms, in several 
areas of potential comparative advantage. Thus, a large number of products continue to 
be reserved, to a varying extent, for small-scale producers. Such restrictions virtually 
assure China’s dominance in these sectors compared with India.  
 
India’s tax and tariff structures similarly remain anti-export biased. India’s high 
overall tariff rates, especially tariffs on intermediate products that are used by exporters, 
impose a heavy indirect tax on export competitiveness. There are duty drawback systems 
to reduce this anti-export bias, but such programs are administratively burdensome and 
often too costly to use effectively. Finally, the regulatory attitude towards foreign direct 
investors, who could be the fuel for India’s export drive, continues to be ambivalent. The 
government promotes FDI on the one hand, but then maintains regulations against full 
foreign ownership, or insists on lengthy approval processes, on the other hand.    
 
Both the hardware and software of export-led growth need revamping.  On the 
hardware side, the development of industrial parks for exports should be greatly 
intensified and enhanced. Private developers need the freedom to acquire urban and peri-
urban land and to develop privately financed infrastructure in support of exports. The 
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government must take urgent measures to reduce export costs, including private-sector 
provision of port services; zero tariff ratings on capital and intermediate goods imports 
used for export (based on an effective duty exemption scheme); enhanced export-oriented 
infrastructure, especially roads to the airports, reliable power supply, and 
telecommunications facilities to support export zones.   
 
Labor legislation should be revised to allow managerial flexibility in the hire and 
dismissal of workers in export-oriented sectors. The reservation of labor-intensive sectors 
to small-scale enterprises should simply be scrapped. This is the kiss of death to effective 
international competitiveness in labor-intensive exports. The government should actively 
encourage inward investment in export-oriented sectors, allowing 100 percent foreign 
ownership without administrative interference, and with the provision of generous tax 
holidays as necessary to attract internationally mobile capital from other locations. 
 
 
Lessons for Gujarat: 
 
I Legislative and policy reforms: 
 
1) Working with the federal government, move expeditiously to reform labor laws, to 
begin with, at least with respect to the SEZs. Labor laws in Chinese SEZs are more 
favorable, allowing labor contracts to be modified or rescinded through consultations 
between both parties. 2) An exit policy needs to be formulated such that firms can exit 
from the market freely. Exit policy needs to be designed in a way that it removes exit 
barriers and at the same time protects the necessary internal order in the firms. 3) Remove 
unnecessary restrictions on equity participation by foreign companies. 4) Standardize 
guidelines for environmental issues. 5) Strengthen intellectual property rules, especially 
in sectors where India has a comparative advantage with its educated and skilled 
workforce. 6) Reduce the variance of FDI laws based on sector. 7) Increase trade 
openness. 
 
II Government processes and machinery: 
 
1) Increase areas for automatic approval. 2) Reduce the role of the approving bodies.  
3) Streamline the number of agencies involved when approvals are necessary. 
 
Center-State dynamics: 1) Devolve more authority in selected areas to the States to 
negotiate FDI projects.  
 
III Infrastructure:  
 
1) Increase political commitment, regulatory transparency, and dispute resolution 
mechanisms to attract foreign participation in infrastructure. 2) Focus immediately on the 
infrastructure of ports, roads, telecommunications, and airports in selected areas to make 
the state more attractive to foreign investors. 
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IV Concentrated zones for FDI activity: 
 
1) Establish SEZs all along the Gujarat coast on an expedited time table. This is critical in 
view of the fact that several Indian states are in the process of setting up such SEZs and 
the sooner Gujarat’s SEZs are up and running, the better it will be for attracting both 
potential domestic and foreign investors. 2) Use SEZs to provide special procedures for 
these projects and increase trade openness. 3) Expand the use of technology parks and 
other zones that increase the opportunities for agglomeration of industries for which India 
is particularly attractive. 4) As the example of Guangdong and Jiangsu show, export-
oriented manufacturing FFEs belonged to the small and medium-scale enterprises. The 
large scale FFEs were setup to serve local markets. In order to establish export-oriented 
manufacturing units, China’s example would suggest an emphasis on small-and-medium-
scale enterprises. 
 
V Networking with Non-resident Indians: 
 
As in the case of China’s coastal provinces, where overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and Macao have invested heavily in mainland China, develop networks with 
Gujarati Non-resident Indians to encourage them to invest in Gujarat. Guangdong 
leveraged its relationships with the global Chinese community to attract FDI flows, 
which laid the foundation of small and medium-scale enterprises. Similarly, Gujarat 
should leverage relationships with the global Gujarati community, well know for its 
trading acumen, to attract foreign investment for the state. 
 
VI Engagement of foreign investors: 
 
1) Create a council of senior Gujarat state government officials and representatives of 
large foreign-invested companies to: a) deepen the insights into issues that impede FDI 
b) develop high impact actions; c) learn from these actions and adjust quickly; and d) 
build mutual respect and trust. Some examples of such Councils are given in Appendix I. 
 
Indian federal and Gujarat state officials meet with foreign business people in many fora 
in India and abroad to market Gujarat and to provide occasions for sharing of views. 
Some of these meetings are organized jointly with Indian business associations also. 
While there is not a lack of effort to meet, as potential foreign investors admit, the 
processes are not perceived as effective. The meetings generally amount to speeches in 
which platitudes are expressed or, if genuine concerns are voiced, they are seen as 
unreasonable criticism. Besides, the format of the meetings neither permits deeper 
dialogue, nor the development of possible solutions. Therefore, these meetings, though 
well intentioned and often costly, are not considered useful by senior foreign participants. 
Hence the real decision-makers in the large foreign companies generally do not take them 
seriously.  
 
The quality and style of the process of engagement must change to attract the people who 
matter and to improve the outcomes.  
 
The goals of the process for engaging foreign investors must be: 
1) Understand together what the needs of various stakeholders are and how insightful, 
high-impact changes could be made with little disturbance.  
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2) Develop a sense of deeper partnership and involvement in finding solutions. 
3) Develop a panel of foreign participants who are willing to propagate the message that 
Gujarat welcomes foreign investment. 
 
VII Proximity to Financial Hub: 
 
Shanghai and Hong Kong served as the financial gateways for the coastal regions of 
China. The financial services infrastructure played an important role in handling capital 
flows towards the regions. Bombay and Ahmedabad, in close proximity to Gujarat, have 
the requisite financial infrastructure to serve foreign capital intended for the state. The 
state government should strive to establish appropriate relationships with financial 
service firms in these cities so as to facilitate the investment process. 
 
VIII Follow-up of Global Investors’ Summit: 
 
It is critical that appropriate follow-up action is taken on the 76 MOUs that were entered 
into for investments worth Indian Rs.66,068 crores20 (roughly $140 billion). It is certainly 
very encouraging that the September 2003 Summit helped the state government show-
case the potential of the state as an attractive investment destination and enter into 
agreements with potential investors. However, how many of these proposed investments 
actually turn into projects on the ground will be the real test. 
                                                          
20 One crore = 10 million 
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Number and type of opened zone Location 
1979 3 Special Economic Zones Guangdong. 
1980 1 Special Economic Zone Fujian. 




10 Economic and Technological Development Zones 
Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangdong and Guangxi. 
 
Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong. 
1985 1 Economic and Technological Development Zone 
 
3 Coastal Open Economic Zones 
Fujian. 
 
Pearl river delta, Yangtze river delta 
and Fujian. 
1986 2 Economic and Technological Development Zones Shanghai. 
1988 Open Coastal Belt 
 
 
1 Special Economic Zone 
 
1 Economic and Technological Development Zone 






1990 Pudong New Area Shanghai 




10 major cities along the Yangtze river 
 
 
13 Border Economic Cooperation Zones 
 
 
All capital cities of inland provinces and autonomous 
regions 
 
5 Economic and Technological Development Zones 
Tianjin, Guangdong, Liaoning, 
Shandong Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian 
and Hainan. 
 
Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, 
Hubei and Sichuan. 
 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, 





Fujian, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong 
and Zhejiang. 
1993 12 Economic and Technological Development Zones Anhui, Guangdong, Heilongjiang, 
Hubei, Liaoning, Sichuan, Fujian, 
Jilin and Zhejiang. 




Appendix II – International Advisory Councils 
 
1 Hong Kong:  Council of International Advisers 
• Goal:  help the government make Hong Kong a premier financial center and the 
“premier international city in Asia” (compete with Singapore) 
• Initiated in October 1998 by Chief Executive Tung 
• 14 international businessmen 
• First meeting January 20, 1999 
• HK$1.5mm spent 
• More of a PR benefit 
• Maintain confidence of foreign business investors 
• Reinforced what government already said was necessary: 
− Reduce costs—business costs, wages, taxes, property 
− Clean up environment 
− Improve education standards, particularly English 
 
Original Members: 
Name Title Company 
Baumann, Karl-Hermann Chairman, Supervisory Board Siemens AG 
Boonstra, Cor President Royal Philips Electronics 
Desmarais, Andre President Power Corporation of Canada 
Galvin, Christopher President Motorola, Inc. 
Greenberg, Maurice Chairman American International Group 
Kopper, Hilmar Chairman, Supervisory Board Deutsche Bank 
Monod, Jerome Chairman, Supervisory Board Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux 
Murdoch, Rupert Chairman News Corporation 
Purves, Sir William former Chairman HSBC Holdings 
Takagaki, Tasuku Chairman Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
Toyoda, Soichiro Chairman Toyota Motor Corporation 
van den Bergh, Maarten President Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
Volker, Paul Former Chairman US Federal Reserve Board 
Welch, Jack Former Chairman General Electric 
 
2 Jakarta:  Economic, Social and Security Council 
• Goals:  help Abdurrahman Wahid speed up the country’s economic recovery and 
provide a second opinion for the Cabinet: 
“…[G]lobally, the International community…demands a council that gives a second 
opinion, so that in facing the IMF and the World Bank, we will have a sound board 
supported by highly competent, internationally recognized and well-experienced 
figures.” 
— Kwik Kian Gie, Indonesian economist 
• Initiated in Novemer 1999 by President Wahid 




Name Title Company 
Kissinger, Henry former Secretary of State United States 
Lee Kuan Yew Senior Minister Singapore 
Volcker, Paul former Chairman US Federal Reserve Board 
 
3 Shanghai:  International Business Leaders Advisory Council 
• Goal:  help the mayor define Shanghai’s economic problems and then find 
solutions 
• Initiated in 1998 by Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji 
• 27 foreign executives 
• November 1, 1996 meeting:  growing unemployment from restructuring and 
inefficient commercial-distribution network 
• Prior meetings:  contributions to Shaghai’s reform and opening up into a major 
international financial and trade center 
 
     Singapore:  Singapore-US Business Council (SUBC) 
• Goal:  Boost economic cooperation between the two countries by fostering: 
− US-Singapore trade and investment flows 
− Joint ventures between their private sectors in third-country markets 
− Business networking among business leaders 
• Initiated in October 1995 by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
• Ten Americans, 10 Singaporeans, chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan 
• First meeting August 7-9, 1996—scheduled to meet every 18 months for two days 
in Singapore 
• Mickey Kantor invited 
• Economic Development Board (Singapore) serves as secretariat and coordinates 
meetings 
• Similar councils with Germany, Britain, France, Australia, and Thailand 
• China tie-in—second meeting in May 1998, China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial 
Park:  “concrete symbol of three-way cooperation” 
 
Original Members: 
Name Title Company 
Bryan, John H. Chairman and CEO Sara Lee Corporation 
Coulter, David Chairman and CEO Bank of America 
Junkins, Jerry R. Chairman and CEO Texas Instruments 
Knight, Charles F. Chairman and CEO Emerson Electric 
Loucks, Vernon Jr. Chairman and CEO Baxter International 
Luciano, Robert P. Chairman and CEO Schering-Plough Corporation 
Lucio, Noto Chairman and CEO Mobil Oil Corporation 
Raymond, Lee R. Chairman and CEO Exxon Corporation 
Shugart, Alan F. Chairman and CEO Seagate Technology International 
Warner, Douglas A. III Chairman and CEO J.P. Morgan & Company 
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4 South Africa:  International Investment Council 
• Goal:  “…ensure that South Africa is an attractive destination for foreign 
investment 
• Initiated by President Thabo Mbeki, June 1999 
• To address high interest rates, growth, high unemployment, and the country’s 
competitiveness 
• 13 international business leaders 
 
Original Members: 
Name Title Company 
FitzGerald, Niall Chairman and CEO Unilever, PLC 
Makihara, Minoru Chairman Mitsubishi Corporation 
O’Reilly, Anthony J.F. Irish media mogul  
Rhodes, William Vice-Chairman Citigroup, Inc. 
Schremp, Juergen Chairman and CEO DaimlerChrysler AG 





FDI and other Foreign Investment in China by Provinces 1997-2002 USD million 
 
 1997 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 













National Total 45257.04 7130.3 100.00 45462.75 2094.74 100.00 
Regional Total 44901.09 1473.3 99.21 45283.89 1907.6 99.61 
Beijing 1592.86 0 3.52 2168 0 4.77 
Tianjin 2511.35 0 5.55 2113.61 0 4.65 
Hebei 1100.64 2.44 2.43 1428.68 0 3.14 
Shanxi 265.92 3.01 0.59 244.51 0 0.54 
Inner Mongolia 73.25 0 0.16 90.82 0 0.20 
Liaoning 2204.7 161.65 4.87 2190.45 215.79 4.82 
Jilin 402.27 0 0.89 409.17 0 0.90 
Heilongjiang 734.85 0 1.62 526.39 0 1.16 
Shanghai 4225.36 0 9.34 3601.5 66.24 7.92 
Jiangsu 5435.11 0 12.01 6631.79 0 14.59 
Zhejiang 1503.45 0 3.32 1318.02 22.1 2.90 
Anhui 434.43 0 0.96 276.73 0 0.61 
Fujian 4196.66 0.44 9.27 4212.11 0 9.26 
Jiangxi 477.68 3.35 1.06 464.96 0 1.02 
Shandong 2492.94 282.62 5.51 2202.74 528.26 4.85 
Henan 692.04 0 1.53 0 616.54 1.36 
Hubei 790.19 58.47 1.75 972.94 63.55 2.14 
Hunan 917.02 0 2.03 818.16 0 1.80 
Guangdong 11710.83 924.12 25.88 12019.94 1011.66 26.44 
Guangxi 879.86 5.93 1.94 886.13 0 1.95 
Hainan 705.54 0 1.56 717.15 0 1.58 
Chongqing 386.75 31.27 0.85 431.07 0 0.95 
Sichuan 248.46 0 0.55 372.48 0 0.82 
Guizhou 49.77 0 0.11 45.35 0 0.10 
Yunnan 165.66 0 0.37 145.68 0 0.32 
Tibet 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
Shaanxi 628.16 0 1.39 300.1 0 0.66 
Gansu 41.44 0 0.09 38.64 0 0.08 
Qinghai 2.47 0 0.01 0 0 0.00 
Ningxia 6.71 0 0.01 18.56 0 0.04 
Xinjiang 24.72 0 0.05 21.67 0 0.05 




FDI and other Foreign Investment in China by Provinces 1997-2002 USD million  
 
 1999 1999 1999 2000 2000 2000 














National Total 40318.71 2128.25 100.00 40714.81 8641.46 100.00 
Regional Total 39934.82 0 99.05 40332.89 1710.97 99.06 
Beijing 1975.25 0 4.90 1683.68 0 4.14 
Tianjin 1763.99 0 4.38 1166.01 0 2.86 
Hebei 1042.02 0 2.58 679.23 3.71 1.67 
Shanxi 391.29 0 0.97 224.72 0 0.55 
Inner Mongolia 64.56 0 0.16 105.68 0 0.26 
Liaoning 1061.73 0 2.63 2044.46 0 5.02 
Jilin 301.2 0 0.75 337.01 0 0.83 
Heilongjiang 318.28 0 0.79 300.86 0 0.74 
Shanghai 2836.65 0 7.04 3160.14 0 7.76 
Jiangsu 6077.56 0 15.07 6425.5 0 15.78 
Zhejiang 1232.62 0 3.06 1612.66 0 3.96 
Anhui 261.31 0 0.65 318.47 0 0.78 
Fujian 4024.03 0 9.98 3431.91 0 8.43 
Jiangxi 320.8 0 0.80 227.24 0 0.56 
Shandong 2258.78 206.69 5.60 2971.19 56.36 7.30 
Henan 521.35 0 1.29 564.03 0 1.39 
Hubei 914.88 74.26 2.27 943.68 92.44 2.32 
Hunan 653.74 0 1.62 678.33 0 1.67 
Guangdong 11657.5 1234.88 28.91 11280.91 1554.03 27.71 
Guangxi 635.12 0 1.58 524.66 3 1.29 
Hainan 484.49 0 1.20 430.8 0 1.06 
Chongqing 238.93 2.42 0.59 244.36 1.43 0.60 
Sichuan 341.01 0 0.85 436.94 0 1.07 
Guizhou 40.9 0 0.10 25.01 0 0.06 
Yunnan 153.85 0 0.38 128.12 0 0.31 
Tibet 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
Shaanxi 241.97 0 0.60 288.42 0 0.71 
Gansu 41.04 0 0.10 62.35 0 0.15 
Qinghai 4.59 0 0.01 0 0 0.00 
Ningxia 51.34 0 0.13 17.41 0 0.04 
Xinjiang 24.04 0 0.06 19.11 0 0.05 




FDI and other Foreign Investment in China by Provinces 1997-2002 USD million  
 
 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002 














National Total 46877.59 2794.53 100.00 52742.86 2268.26 100.00 
Regional Total 46367 1946.53 98.91 52471.26 2268.26 99.49 
Beijing 1768.18 0 3.77 1724.64 0 3.27 
Tianjin 2133.48 0 4.55 1581.95 0 3.00 
Hebei 669.89 6.94 1.43 782.71 4.9 1.48 
Shanxi 233.93 0 0.50 211.64 0 0.40 
Inner Mongolia 107.03 0 0.23 177.01 0 0.34 
Liaoning 2516.12 0 5.37 3411.68 0 6.47 
Jilin 337.66 0 0.72 244.68 0 0.46 
Heilongjiang 341.14 0 0.73 355.11 0 0.67 
Shanghai 4291.59 0 9.15 4272.29 0 8.10 
Jiangsu 6914.82 0 14.75 10189.6 0 19.32 
Zhejiang 2211.62 0 4.72 3076.1 0 5.83 
Anhui 336.72 0 0.72 383.75 0 0.73 
Fujian 3918.04 0 8.36 3838.37 0 7.28 
Jiangxi 395.75 0 0.84 1081.97 0 2.05 
Shandong 3520.93 0 7.51 4734.04 66.06 8.98 
Henan 457.29 0 0.98 404.63 0 0.77 
Hubei 1188.6 235.65 2.54 1426.65 218.7 2.70 
Hunan 810.11 0 1.73 900.22 0 1.71 
Guangdong 11932.03 1702.63 25.45 11334 1977.32 21.49 
Guangxi 384.16 0 0.82 417.26 0 0.79 
Hainan 466.91 0 1.00 511.96 0 0.97 
Chongqing 256.49 1.31 0.55 195.76 1.28 0.37 
Sichuan 581.88 0 1.24 555.83 0 1.05 
Guizhou 28.29 0 0.06 38.21 0 0.07 
Yunnan 64.57 0 0.14 111.69 0 0.21 
Tibet 0 0 0.00 0 0 0.00 
Shaanxi 351.74 0 0.75 360.05 0 0.68 
Gansu 74.39 0 0.16 61.21 0 0.12 
Qinghai 36.49 0 0.08 47.26 0 0.09 
Ningxia 16.8 0 0.04 22 0 0.04 
Xinjiang 20.35 0 0.04 18.99 0 0.04 
Ministry Total 510.59 848 1.09 271.6 0 0.51 
 
Notes:  Foreign Direct Investment refers to the investments inside China by foreign enterprises and 
economic organizations or individuals (including overseas Chinese, compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao 
and Taiwan, and Chinese enterprises registered abroad), following the relevant policies and laws of China, 
for the establishment of ventures exclusively with foreign own investment, Sino-foreign joint ventures and 
cooperative enterprises or for co-operative exploration of resources with enterprises or economic 
organizations in China. It includes the re-investment of the foreign entrepreneurs with the profits gained 
from the investment and the funds that enterprises borrow from abroad in the total investment of projects 
which are approved by the relevant department of the government. 
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Other Investment by Foreign Entrepreneurs refers to all forms of utilization of foreign capitals other 
than foreign borrowings and foreign direct investment. It includes the total value of stock shares in foreign 
currencies issued by enterprises at domestic or foreign stock exchanges (now mainly consisting of H shares 
issued at Hong Kong Security Market and B shares issued at domestic security markets), rent payable for 
the imported equipment through international leasing arrangement, cost of imported equipment, technology 
and materials provided by foreign counterparts in compensation trade and processing and assembly trade.  
 





Existing Definitional Difference of FDI between China and India 
 
IMF China India 
Equity capital Equity capital Equity capital reported on the 
basis of issue/ transfer of equity 
or preference shares to foreign 
direct investors 
Reinvested earnings of foreign 
companies 
Reinvested earnings of foreign 
companies 
NA 
Inter-company debt transactions Inter-company debt transactions NA 
Short-term and long-term loans Short-term and long-term loans NA 
Financial leasing Financial leasing NA 
Trade credits Trade credits NA 
Grants Grants NA 
Bonds Bonds NA 
Non-cash acquisition of equity 
(tangible and intangible 
components such as technology 
fee, brand name, etc.) 
Non-cash acquisition of equity 
(tangible and intangible 
components such as technology 
fee, brand name, etc.) 
NA 
Investment made by foreign 
venture capital investors 
Investment made by foreign 
venture capital investors 
NA 
Earnings data of indirectly-held 
FDI enterprises 
Earnings data of indirectly-held 
FDI enterprises 
NA  
Control premium Control premium NA 
Non-competition fee Non-competition fee NA 
 Imported Equipment NA 
 Round-tripping of capital NA 
 
Source: Bajpai and Dasgupta (2004) 
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Table 3: FDI and GDP 1998-2002, USD Billion 
 
 1998 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999 
Region GDP FDI 
FDI as 
Percent of 




Beijing 2.43 2.17 89.24 2.63 1.98 75.20 
Tianjin 1.98 2.11 106.93 1.75 1.76 100.71 
Hebei 5.14 1.43 27.79 5.52 1.04 18.88 
Shanxi 1.93 0.24 12.64 1.82 0.39 21.50 
Inner 
Mongolia 1.44 0.09 6.31 1.53 0.06 4.21 
Liaoning 4.69 2.19 46.72 5.04 1.06 21.07 
Jilin 1.88 0.41 21.74 2.02 0.30 14.93 
Heilongjiang 3.42 0.53 15.38 3.50 0.32 9.09 
Shanghai 4.45 3.60 80.84 4.87 2.84 58.20 
Jiangsu 8.70 6.63 76.26 9.30 6.08 65.36 
Zheijiang 6.02 1.32 21.88 6.48 1.23 19.02 
Anhui 3.39 0.28 8.17 3.51 0.26 7.44 
Fujian 4.02 4.21 104.72 4.29 4.02 93.83 
Jiangxi 2.24 0.46 20.79 2.37 0.32 13.53 
Shandong 8.65 2.20 25.46 9.26 2.26 24.40 
Henan 5.26 0.00 0.00 5.53 0.52 9.43 
Hubei 4.47 0.97 21.75 4.66 0.91 19.63 
Hunan 3.88 0.82 21.09 4.02 0.65 16.27 
Guangdong 9.57 12.02 125.66 10.22 11.66 114.01 
Guangxi 2.30 0.89 38.55 2.36 0.64 26.92 
Hainan 0.53 0.72 135.27 0.57 0.48 85.11 
Sichuan 1.73 0.43 24.97 1.79 0.24 13.37 
Chongqing 4.32 0.37 8.61 4.48 0.34 7.61 
Guizhou 1.02 0.05 4.46 1.10 0.04 3.71 
Yunnan 2.17 0.15 6.72 2.24 0.15 6.86 
Tibet 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Shaanxi 1.67 0.30 17.98 1.80 0.24 13.47 
Gansu 1.05 0.04 3.68 1.13 0.04 3.65 
Qinghai 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.59 
Ningxia 0.27 0.02 6.76 0.29 0.05 17.60 
Xinjiang 1.35 0.02 1.61 1.41 0.02 1.70 




Table 3: FDI and GDP 1998-2002, USD Billion  
 
 2000 2000 2000 2001 2001 2001 
Region GDP FDI 
FDI as 
Percent of 




Beijing 2.99 1.68 56.23 3.44 1.77 51.43 
Tianjin 1.98 1.17 58.88 2.22 2.13 95.97 
Hebei 6.15 0.68 11.05 6.74 0.67 9.94 
Shanxi 1.99 0.22 11.32 2.15 0.23 10.88 
Inner 
Mongolia 1.69 0.11 6.24 1.87 0.11 5.73 
Liaoning 5.64 2.04 36.25 6.08 2.52 41.38 
Jilin 2.20 0.34 15.32 2.46 0.34 13.75 
Heilongjiang 3.93 0.30 7.66 4.30 0.34 7.93 
Shanghai 5.50 3.16 57.48 5.98 4.29 71.75 
Jiangsu 10.37 6.43 61.98 11.49 6.91 60.17 
Zheijiang 7.29 1.61 22.12 8.15 2.21 27.13 
Anhui 3.67 0.32 8.68 3.97 0.34 8.47 
Fujian 4.74 3.43 72.48 5.14 3.92 76.24 
Jiangxi 2.42 0.23 9.39 2.63 0.40 15.06 
Shandong 10.32 2.97 28.79 11.40 3.52 30.88 
Henan 6.21 0.56 9.09 6.81 0.46 6.71 
Hubei 5.17 0.94 18.27 5.63 1.19 21.10 
Hunan 4.46 0.68 15.21 4.81 0.81 16.83 
Guangdong 11.67 11.28 96.65 12.86 11.93 92.75 
Guangxi 2.48 0.52 21.19 2.70 0.38 14.25 
Hainan 0.63 0.43 68.78 0.66 0.47 70.79 
Sichuan 1.92 0.24 12.73 2.11 0.26 12.13 
Chongqing 4.84 0.44 9.02 5.34 0.58 10.89 
Guizhou 1.20 0.03 2.08 1.31 0.03 2.16 
Yunnan 2.36 0.13 5.42 2.51 0.06 2.58 
Tibet 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 
Shaanxi 2.01 0.29 14.38 2.23 0.35 15.79 
Gansu 1.19 0.06 5.25 1.30 0.07 5.74 
Qinghai 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.04 10.04 
Ningxia 0.32 0.02 5.43 0.36 0.02 4.66 
Xinjiang 1.65 0.02 1.16 1.79 0.02 1.13 




Table 3: FDI and GDP 1998-2002, USD Billion  
 
 2002 2002 2002 
Region GDP FDI 
FDI as Percent of 
GDP 
Beijing 3.89 1.72 44.37 
Tianjin 2.48 1.58 63.84 
Hebei 7.40 0.78 10.58 
Shanxi 2.44 0.21 8.68 
Inner 
Mongolia 2.10 0.18 8.45 
Liaoning 6.59 3.41 51.74 
Jilin 2.71 0.24 9.02 
Heilongjiang 4.69 0.36 7.57 
Shanghai 6.53 4.27 65.38 
Jiangsu 12.84 10.19 79.33 
Zheijiang 9.42 3.08 32.66 
Anhui 4.31 0.38 8.90 
Fujian 5.66 3.84 67.86 
Jiangxi 2.96 1.08 36.55 
Shandong 12.75 4.73 37.13 
Henan 7.45 0.40 5.43 
Hubei 6.01 1.43 23.73 
Hunan 5.24 0.90 17.16 
Guangdong 14.22 11.33 79.71 
Guangxi 2.97 0.42 14.07 
Hainan 0.73 0.51 70.14 
Sichuan 2.38 0.20 8.22 
Chongqing 5.89 0.56 9.44 
Guizhou 1.43 0.04 2.67 
Yunnan 2.70 0.11 4.14 
Tibet 0.20 0.00 0.00 
Shaanxi 2.46 0.36 14.64 
Gansu 140.32 0.06 0.04 
Qinghai 0.41 0.05 11.47 
Ningxia 0.40 0.02 5.53 
Xinjiang 1.93 0.02 0.98 
National 281.51 52.74 18.74 
 
Source: Cumulated from China Statistical Yearbooks (1999-2003); Hebei Statistical Yearbook, 2003; 
Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook, 2003; Zheijiang Statistical Yearbook, 2003; Fujian Statistical Yearbook, 





Foreign Funded Enterprises and Urban Employment Generation by Province 
(10,000 workers) 
 
























Beijing 510.1 15.5 3.04 506 18.1 3.58 
Tianjin 318.5 7.6 2.39 319.8 12.9 4.03 
Hebei 760.8 5.4 0.71 793.8 7.2 0.91 
Shanxi 509.7 1.9 0.37 513.4 1.9 0.37 
Inner 
Mongolia 432.5 1.7 0.39 435 2.2 0.51 
Liaoning 1152 12.9 1.12 1167.9 17.8 1.52 
Jilin 606.7 5.3 0.87 623.4 6.2 0.99 
Heilongjiang 949 5 0.53 968.9 5.5 0.57 
Shanghai 530.3 17.2 3.24 537.6 22.2 4.13 
Jiangsu 973.8 16.1 1.65 992.4 18 1.81 
Zhejiang 592.6 12 2.02 603.7 12.7 2.10 
Anhui 576.7 2.1 0.36 614.6 3.8 0.62 
Fujian 417.4 23.1 5.53 418.5 16.4 3.92 
Jiangxi 485.2 1.3 0.27 503.1 1.9 0.38 
Shandong 984.6 12.5 1.27 1052.9 24.7 2.35 
Henan 891.6 6.4 0.72 923.7 7.6 0.82 
Hubei 846.6 3.3 0.39 896.6 4.2 0.47 
Hunan 716 1.9 0.27 750 3.2 0.43 
Guangdong 1076 29.1 2.70 1137.6 35.8 3.15 
Guangxi 401.1 4.1 1.02 417.9 5.7 1.36 
Hainan 134.1 1.7 1.27 132.4 1.8 1.36 
Chongqing       
Sichuan 1097.6 3.7 0.34 1157.6 5.1 0.44 
Guizhou 270.8 1 0.37 269.4 1.5 0.56 
Yunnan 345.9 1.1 0.32 351 1 0.28 
Tibet       
Shaanxi 436.7 1.2 0.27 449.5 1.2 0.27 
Gansu 282.9 0.6 0.21 283.4 1.1 0.39 
Qinghai 73 0.1 0.14 73.3 0.1 0.14 
Ningxia 78.5 0.6 0.76 81.1 0.9 1.11 




Foreign Funded Enterprises and Urban Employment Generation by Province   
 
























Beijing 496.7 20.7 4.17 499.6 21.2 4.24 
Tianjin 317 15 4.73 318.8 18.2 5.71 
Hebei 808 8 0.99 801.7 8.1 1.01 
Shanxi 524.8 1.9 0.36 519.1 1.8 0.35 
Inner 
Mongolia 438.5 2.7 0.62 445 2.8 0.63 
Liaoning 1159.5 17.2 1.48 1141.8 19.1 1.67 
Jilin 628.4 7.2 1.15 621.2 7.4 1.19 
Heilongjiang 968 4.6 0.48 970.6 4.7 0.48 
Shanghai 537.3 27.1 5.04 527.7 29.8 5.65 
Jiangsu 989.2 22.1 2.23 995.1 23.8 2.39 
Zhejiang 605.9 14.4 2.38 600.7 14.8 2.46 
Anhui 627.4 3.5 0.56 646.9 4 0.62 
Fujian 426.6 28.4 6.66 432.1 32.2 7.45 
Jiangxi 521.1 1.6 0.31 527.3 2.5 0.47 
Shandong 1084.7 25.9 2.39 1118.3 28.9 2.58 
Henan 981.4 7.3 0.74 1001.8 7.2 0.72 
Hubei 899.5 4.1 0.46 925.2 4.7 0.51 
Hunan 781.7 3.3 0.42 815.9 3.6 0.44 
Guangdong 1141.8 40.3 3.53 1156.5 42.6 3.68 
Guangxi 419.6 5.4 1.29 420.1 6.6 1.57 
Hainan 128.9 1.9 1.47 121.1 2.2 1.82 
Chongqing    369 2.8 0.76 
Sichuan 1142.5 6 0.53 794 3.6 0.45 
Guizhou 277.8 1.2 0.43 281.2 1.4 0.50 
Yunnan 357.9 1.2 0.34 363.6 1.5 0.41 
Tibet    22.4 0.1 0.45 
Shaanxi 467.3 1.2 0.26 469.8 1.3 0.28 
Gansu 288.2 1.2 0.42 285.5 1.1 0.39 
Qinghai 73.6 0.2 0.27 74 0.1 0.14 
Ningxia 81.4 1 1.23 83.7 1.1 1.31 




Foreign Funded Enterprises and Urban Employment Generation by Province  
 
























Beijing 463.3 18.5 3.99 456.6 20.6 4.51 
Tianjin 253.9 6.3 2.48 251.8 22.2 8.82 
Hebei 746.9 11.7 1.57 746.6 6.7 0.90 
Shanxi 459.3 8.2 1.79 455.7 1 0.22 
Inner 
Mongolia 399.8 6.9 1.73 396 2.1 0.53 
Liaoning 884.9 17.4 1.97 857.5 18.9 2.20 
Jilin 511 16 3.13 475.4 5.7 1.20 
Heilongjiang 818.6 18.4 2.25 784.9 3.6 0.46 
Shanghai 446.8 24.5 5.48 419.7 36.8 8.77 
Jiangsu 899.1 21.4 2.38 886.3 28.6 3.23 
Zhejiang 554.5 22.2 4.00 570.7 12.3 2.16 
Anhui 593.5 17.7 2.98 588.2 4 0.68 
Fujian 421.6 7.2 1.71 417.1 36.5 8.75 
Jiangxi 429.9 2.1 0.49 415.7 2 0.48 
Shandong 1061.4 34.5 3.25 1079 33.9 3.14 
Henan 932.4 29.8 3.20 893.9 5.8 0.65 
Hubei 845.8 27.4 3.24 802.5 3.5 0.44 
Hunan 711.6 9.8 1.38 685.9 2.8 0.41 
Guangdong 1104.4 30.7 2.78 1095.7 40.5 3.70 
Guangxi 402.8 7.5 1.86 401.2 4.1 1.02 
Hainan 110.5 2.6 2.35 110.9 1.6 1.44 
Chongqing 328.1 9 2.74 296.5 2.2 0.74 
Sichuan 705.2 30.8 4.37 684.1 3.8 0.56 
Guizhou 263.7 3.7 1.40 247.7 1.3 0.52 
Yunnan 361.7 7.9 2.18 362.2 1.2 0.33 
Tibet 20.9 0.1 0.48 21.3  0.00 
Shaanxi 446.3 9.3 2.08 455 1.6 0.35 
Gansu 268.9 2.5 0.93 266.4 0.9 0.34 
Qinghai 68.1 0.2 0.29 67.9  0.00 
Ningxia 78.3 2 2.55 78.8 1 1.27 




Foreign Funded Enterprises and Urban Employment Generation by Province  
 
























Beijing 456.3 23.8 5.22 464.2 25.7 5.54 
Tianjin 238.6 24.6 10.31 241.3 27 11.19 
Hebei 734.1 6.9 0.94 661.7 7.5 1.13 
Shanxi 430.5 0.9 0.21 424.3 1.2 0.28 
Inner 
Mongolia 385.1 2.2 0.57 380.8 1.8 0.47 
Liaoning 846.6 20.9 2.47 855.9 21.6 2.52 
Jilin 437.9 5.9 1.35 417.2 6.1 1.46 
Heilongjiang 721.8 3.4 0.47 712.2 3.6 0.51 
Shanghai 417.5 40.3 9.65 437.4 40.2 9.19 
Jiangsu 870.8 31.4 3.61 881 34.3 3.89 
Zhejiang 592.1 13.9 2.35 601.9 14.5 2.41 
Anhui 575.1 3.6 0.63 568.2 4.1 0.72 
Fujian 416.1 40.3 9.69 422.6 35.7 8.45 
Jiangxi 388.1 1.4 0.36 380.8 1.4 0.37 
Shandong 1022.2 38.7 3.79 1018 42.3 4.16 
Henan 859.3 5.5 0.64 828.8 5.4 0.65 
Hubei 726.1 4.7 0.65 670.8 5.8 0.86 
Hunan 606 2.9 0.48 561.3 2.3 0.41 
Guangdong 1075.9 43 4.00 1104.1 46.4 4.20 
Guangxi 385 3.8 0.99 383.9 3.8 0.99 
Hainan 109.7 1.7 1.55 110.2 1.7 1.54 
Chongqing 283.9 2.6 0.92 136.6 2.7 1.98 
Sichuan 646.8 3.3 0.51 361 3.1 0.86 
Guizhou 243.3 1.2 0.49 158 1 0.63 
Yunnan 346.5 1.3 0.38 212 1.3 0.61 
Tibet 22.6  0.00 15.8  0.00 
Shaanxi 469.6 1.6 0.34 265.1 2.3 0.87 
Gansu 247.6 0.9 0.36 163.1 1.4 0.86 
Qinghai 66.6  0.00 37.2  0.00 
Ningxia 76.5 1 1.31 48.8 0.8 1.64 




Foreign Funded Enterprises and Urban Employment Generation by Province  
 













Beijing 633.3 29.2 4.61 
Tianjin 234.4 29.7 12.67 
Hebei 653.9 9 1.38 
Shanxi 417.1 1.3 0.31 
Inner 
Mongolia 359.6 2 0.56 
Liaoning 848.5 24.8 2.92 
Jilin 439.4 6.4 1.46 
Heilongjiang 697.2 3.3 0.47 
Shanghai 489.3 51 10.42 
Jiangsu 856.3 37.7 4.40 
Zhejiang 649.2 16 2.46 
Anhui 562.4 4.3 0.76 
Fujian 436 37 8.49 
Jiangxi 377.7 1.9 0.50 
Shandong 1056.7 50.1 4.74 
Henan 831.1 5.2 0.63 
Hubei 669.9 5.6 0.84 
Hunan 570.5 2.8 0.49 
Guangdong 1186.4 54.1 4.56 
Guangxi 381.6 3.8 1.00 
Hainan 108.2 1.3 1.20 
Chongqing 298 2.9 0.97 
Sichuan 646.5 4.6 0.71 
Guizhou 239.6 1 0.42 
Yunnan 350.5 1.6 0.46 
Tibet 25.3  0.00 
Shaanxi 510.5 2 0.39 
Gansu 246.7 1.4 0.57 
Qinghai 70  0.00 
Ningxia 78.3 0.8 1.02 
Xinjiang 328 0.7 0.21 
 
Source: Cumulated from China Statistical Yearbooks (1995-2002) 
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 (US $100 mil.) 
Export by FIEs  
(US $100 mil.) 
Contribution to local 
exports of FIEs (%) 
National Total 2492.1 1194.41 48 
Beijing 76.6 28.71 37 
Tianjin 76.8 63.79 83 
Hebei 32.8 10.12 31 
Sanxi 20.9 1.52 7 
Inner Mongolia 11.2 1.38 12 
Liaoning 105.9 62.45 59 
Jilin 14.9 3.92 26 
Heilongjiang 24.2 2.67 11 
Shanghai 246.4 142.61 58 
Jiangsu 263.8 144.53 55 
Zheijiang 204.8 53.49 26 
Anhui 21.2 4 19 
Fujian 136.3 75.97 56 
Jiangxi 11.9 1.63 14 
Shangdong 160.9 79.82 50 
Henan 15.8 3.09 20 
Hubei 19 4.3 23 
Hunan 16.3 1.82 11 
Guangdong 934.3 495.1 53 
Guangxi 16.4 3.41 21 
Hainan 6.1 3.05 50 
Sichuan 10.6 0.9 8 
Chongqing 14.3 3.42 24 
Guizhou 4.8 0.4 8 
Yunnan 10.9 0.81 7 
Tibet 1.1 0.04 4 
Shaanxi 13.3 1.16 9 
Gansu 4.2 0.38 9 
Qinghai 1.4 0.02 1 
Ningxia 3.5 0.43 12 
Xinjiang 11.5 0.91 8 
Note: FIEs refers to Foreign Invested Enterprises.  
Source: Cumulated by OECD, 2002, by the data from MOFTEC: “Statistics on FDI in China 




Share of Value Added of Industry of FIEs in Provinces (2000) (100 million USD) 
 
Provinces 
Total Value Added of 
Industries 
Value Added of 
Industries by FIEs 
Share of Value Added 
of FIEs in the Total (%) 
National Total 21564.74 4850.92 22 
Beijing 584.48 218.01 37 
Tianjin 490.09 178.78 36 
Hebei 976.62 89.46 9 
Sanxi 400.65 14.01 3 
Inner Mongolia 235.73 14.49 6 
Liaoning 935.84 153.11 16 
Jilin 412.22 72.72 18 
Heilongjiang 933.8 35.08 4 
Shanghai 1541.71 727.25 47 
Jiangsu 2234.58 544.12 24 
Zheijiang 1267.75 217.39 17 
Anhui 494.51 40.27 8 
Fujian 665.02 369.85 57 
Jiangxi 248.97 19.05 8 
Shangdong 2098.8 262.28 12 
Henan 993.62 75.15 8 
Hubei 946.42 101.96 11 
Hunan 461.82 26.34 6 
Guangdong 2788.16 1504.7 54 
Guangxi 281.8 29.01 10 
Hainan 54.63 11.07 20 
Sichuan 239.47 30.71 13 
Chongqing 634.31 40.17 6 
Guizhou 196.04 4.05 2 
Yunnan 491.12 18.69 4 
Tibet 8.42 0.02 0.2 
Shaanxi 345.95 35.79 10 
Gansu 225.57 6.14 3 
Qinghai 58.32 0.92 2 
Ningxia 61.6 5.07 8 
Xinjiang 256.72 5.28 2 
Note: FIEs refers to Foreign Invested Enterprises.  
Source: Source: Cumulated by OECD, 2002, by the data from MOFTEC: “Statistics on FDI in 




Provincial Exports and Share of Foreign Funded Enterprises (1995, 1999-2002) 
10,000 USD 
 






























Hebei 286635 32607 11.38 311957 80044 25.66 370685 101240 27.31 
Jiangsu 1006300 293600 29.18 1858200 985907 53.06 2638100 1445340 54.79 
Zheijiang 769782 110982 14.42 1287125 332775 25.85 1944279 534851 27.51 
Fujian 790806 354323 44.81 1035193 588818 56.88 1290828 759713 58.85 
Shandong 816101 253751 31.09 1157909 585026 50.52 1552905 792766 51.05 
Guangdong 5659200 2576243 45.52 7770500 3939790 50.70 9191900 4951011 53.86 
Hainan 83000 5777 6.96 74860 28669 38.30 80289 30464 37.94 
 
 
 2001 2001 2001 2002 2002 2002 
Province 
Total 
Exports FFE Exports 
FFE Exports 





Exports FFE Exports 
FFE Exports 




Hebei 395613 114228 28.87 459402 143722 31.28 
Jiangsu 2939300 1664217 56.62 3902900 2424878 62.13 
Zheijiang 2297747 709930 30.90 2941820 920127 31.28 
Fujian 1392232 828809 59.53 1737086 1046590 60.25 
Shandong 1812899 923578 50.94 2115110 1098793 51.95 
Guangdong 9542100 5437384 56.98 11845800 6962505 58.78 
Hainan 80094 30039 37.50 81930 35466 43.29 
 
Source: Cumulated from China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Hebei Statistical Yearbook, 
2003; Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook, 2003; Zheijiang Statistical Yearbook, 2003; Fujian Statistical 
Yearbook, 2003; Shandong Statistical Yearbook, 2003; Guangdong Statistical Yearbook, 2003; 
Hainan Statistical Yearbook, 2003. 
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Table 8 




Wage Other Ownership Units State-owned Units Collective-owned Units 
Zheijiang 18227 14650 22195 13281 
Fujian 13306 11987 15026 10119 
Guangdong 16769 17321 18366 8403 
 
Notes: Other Ownership Units refer to units registered with other types of ownership, including 
cooperative units, joint ownership units, limited companies, share holding corporations, units 
invested by entrepreneurs from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and foreign-invested units. 
State-owned Units refer to economic units whose assts are owned by the state. Included are non-
corporation units registered according to Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Registration of Enterprises and Corporations, state organs, institutions and social organizations at 
the central and local levels. 
Collective Units refer to economic units registered according to Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Registration of Enterprises and Corporations where the means of 
production are collectively owned. 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of Zheijiang, 2003; Statistical Yearbook of Fujian, 2003; Statistical 
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